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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
National Farmers Union Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe of
Indians.' has the potential for significantly changing the prac-
tice of law on and near the approximately one hundred and
fifty Indian reservations served by Indian courts. Rejecting
arguments that Indian courts are generally prohibited by fed-
eral law from exercising jurisdiction in civil matters involving
non-Indians, the Court in National Farmers Union Insurance
unanimously held that Indian courts are, in the first instance,
the exclusive forums for determining their own jurisdiction.
As a result, more suits involving Indian and non-Indian
parties will be brought in the Indian courts when some of the
incidents giving rise to the suit take place on the reservation.
Even the lawyer who does not represent Indians has a substan-
tially increased likelihood of being required to appear in an
Indian court when clients have business dealings with one of
the many hundreds of tribal governments, agencies, and enter-
prises; own property or a business on a reservation; marry into
a family of Indian heritage; are involved in the welfare or
adoption of children; engage in commercial relationships with
individual Indians; or do business with companies belonging to
individual Indians.
In many instances, the jurisdiction of the Indian court over
issues arising on the reservation is exclusive.' The lawyer who
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1. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). See also Iowa Mutual insurance Co. v. La Plante, 107 S.Ct.
971 (1987) (amplifying and strengthening National Farmers Union).
2. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (tribal court jurisdiction is
exclusive to determine custody of Indian child domiciled in reservation); accord
Williams v. Lee, 359 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal court jurisdiction is exclusive when suit is
brought against Indians for activities occurring on reservation); see generally Milbank
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practices in a state where tribal Indians are located should
therefore have some familiarity with the local Indian courts,
their jurisdiction, and sources of law that are being applied in
them.
This article is intended to provide those affected by the
decision a basic understanding of Indian court jurisdiction and
practice. Part II discusses, in more detail, the National Farm-
ers holding. Part III is an overview of the history, structure,
and types of Indian courts. Part IV deals with the complexities
of jurisdiction, and Part V, constitutional and civil rights issues
in Indian courts. Part VI summarizes the basics of Indian
court practice and procedure.
II. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE Co. V. CROW TRIBE
In National Farmers Union Insurance, the action arose
when a Crow Indian was injured on land belonging to a state
school district within the Crow Reservation. The plaintiff filed
a tort action against the school district in the Crow Tribal
Court and personally served the chairman of the school board.
The chairman ignored the complaint and sent it to the school
district's insurer only after the tribal court had entered a
default judgment against the district.
The insurer, National Farmers, obtained a permanent
injunction against the tribal court proceeding from the Federal
District Court in Montana. The district court held that the
Crow Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
tort that was the basis for the default judgment.3 Without
reaching the merits of the question of tribal court jurisdiction,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed on the ground
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
questions raised by the insurer.4 In essence, the court of
appeals held that Congress, by enacting the Indian Civil Rights
Act,5 had limited federal court review of tribal court proceed-
ings to hearings on writs of habeas corpus. The appellate panel
concluded that a district court had no jurisdiction to entertain
Mutual. Ins. Co. v. Eagleman, - Mont. -, 705 P.2d 1117, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 5106
(1985).
3. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213 (D.
Mont. 1983).
4. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.
1984).
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1968).
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a claim that a tribal court had acted beyond the limits of its
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed on the central issue of fed-
eral jurisdiction, finding that a claim of abuse of tribal jurisdic-
tion raises a question "that must be answered by reference to
federal law and is a federal question under section 1331. ' In
its conclusion, the Court pointed out that while Indian tribes
exercise a separate sovereignty rooted in their precolumbian
existence as Indian nations, the present scope of tribal sover-
eignty is generally controlled and limited by federal law.7
National Farmers Union answered two more questions
important to the jurisdiction and effectiveness of Indian courts.
The insurer had contended that under the rule in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Tribe,' in which the Supreme Court held that
tribes had lost the power to prosecute non-Indians for criminal
offenses in their courts, the tribal court was absolutely barred
from exercising jurisdiction over the "non-Indian" state school
board. Noting, however, that the authorities on which the Oli-
phant Court had relied contained language affirming the legiti-
macy of tribal civil jurisdiction, the National Farmers Union
Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the answer to the question whether a tri-
bal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter juris-
diction over non-Indians is not automatically foreclosed, as
an extension of Oliphant would require.9
The Court directed that each assertion of tribal civil jurisdic-
tion be reviewed in the first instance by the Indian Court itself
to determine whether such jurisdiction had been altered,
divested, or diminished by any one of a number of factors.' °
Finally, the Court decided that based on the federal policy
of tribal self-government and self-determination, examination
of a tribe's civil jurisdiction should first be conducted by the
tribal court:
[T]he orderly administration of justice in the federal
6. Nat7 Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852.
7. 1&
8. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
9. Nat7 Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852.
10. The Supreme Court directed the Indian courts to carefully examine tribal
sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty had been altered, relevant statutes,
executive branch policy, treaties, administrative and judicial decisions in deciding
questions involving their own jurisdiction. Id at 855.
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court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed
in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question
concerning appropriate relief is addressed. The risks of ...
"procedural nightmare" . . . will be minimized if the federal
court stays its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a
full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to rec-
tify any errors it may have made.1 1
Thus, the federal courts are instructed to allow Indian
courts to proceed through jurisdictional hearings, trial, and the
tribal appeals process prior to any exercise of federal question
jurisdiction to review the validity of tribal jurisdiction.'
2
National Farmers Insurance concludes a decade of exten-
sive litigation, legislative action, and academic commentary
regarding the jurisdiction of Indian courts. 13  The central issue
upon which much of this activity has been focused is tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians and their property within Indian
reservations.' 4 In the great majority of cases where federal
courts have considered this issue, tribal court jurisdiction has
11. Id. A federal court need not allow the Indian court to proceed where
assertions of tribal court jurisdiction are being used to harass a party, are made in bad
faith, are patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where a party
lacks an adequate opportunity to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction. Id. at 856
n.21; see also Sanders v. Robinson, 772 F. Supp. 913, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 3135 (D. Mont.
1985) (non-Indian defendant in tribal court proceeding may not successfully obtain
federal court jurisdiction simply by alleging that assertion of tribal jurisdiction over
him is per se harassment and beyond the jurisdiction of the tribal court).
12. Several Indian Courts have had occasion to review the scope of their own
jurisdiction. On remand to the Crow Tribal Court, an appellate panel held that the
tribal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy between an Indian and a "non-
Indian" state school district since the actions complained of affect the health, welfare,
and economic interests of the Crow tribe, and also due to consensual relationships
entered into by the tribe and the school district. Crow Tribe Sage v. Lodge Grass
School Dist., 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6035, 6041 (Crow Tribal Ct. App. 1986). See also Deal v.
Blatchford, 3 Navajo Rptr. 159 (1982) (Navajo courts may exercise jurisdiction over
actions involving torts committed by non-Indians against Indians); Hubbard v. Chinle
School Dist., 3 Navajo Rptr. 167 (1982) (jurisdiction of Navajo courts in suit by Indians
against state school district); Accord Tracy v. Yazzie, No. WR-CV- 313-85 (D. Window
Rock, Sept. 16, 1986) (eleventh amendment to U.S. Constitution does not bar suit in
tribal court against state employees); Sandoval v. Tinian, Inc., 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6041,
6092, D. Crownpoint 1986) (tribal court had jurisdiction over non-Indian defendant
when party to contractual relationship inside Indian country); Rosebud Housing
Authority v. La Creek Electric Cooperative, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6030, 6031 (Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Ct. 1986) (tribal court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction
over electrical cooperative operating on reservation); Hopi Tribe v. Lonewolf Scott, et.
al., 14 Indian L. Rptr. 6001 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986) (tribal court has criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians commiting offenses within the reservation).
13. See infra notes 15, 16, 20, 46, 97, 104, 146, 183 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 88.
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been upheld. Generally, the federal courts have decided that
the civil jurisdiction of Indian tribes and their courts depends
on factors other than the Indian status of the parties. The
legal and political history of the tribe whose jurisdiction is
being reviewed is important in defining the scope of that
jurisdiction.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Historic and Legal Roots of the Indian Courts
Most of the Indian courts operating today are located in
western states, but Indian jurisdictions exist in all parts of the
country from Maine to Florida, California to Alaska. The ori-
gins of these Indian courts are diverse and systems of justice
created by Indian people prior to contact with Europeans"5
still influence practice on some reservations. Many contempo-
rary Indian courts, such as the traditional, religious courts of
some of the Pueblos, the courts of the Five Civilized Tribes,
and the river courts of Pacific Coast fishing tribes have their
origins in the Indian society which they serve. The majority of
existing Indian courts are, however, based on the Bureau of
Indian Affairs forums established by reservation superintend-
ents in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 6
The historic recognition of the Indian nations as sover-
eigns separate and apart from the state and federal govern-
ments,' 7 combined with the growth of tribal institutions away
from the tutelage of the federal trustee, have led to the birth
of the modern Indian court system. Contemporary Indian
courts strive to preserve tradition and custom while applying
modern policies developed to support the tribe's role as a mod-
ern government.' 8
15. L. FRENCH, INDIANS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-20 (1982).
16. See W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES (1966); see also V. DELORIA, JR. &
C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983).
17. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (United States and
Navajo Nation are separate sovereigns and prosecution of Navajo Indian by both for
same offense does not violate defendants' right to be free of double jeopardy); see also
Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934).
18. Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6008, 6009 (Intertribal Ct.
App. 1984) (historically, tribe exercised criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians;
modern law enforcement problems and close cultural and social ties between modern
Sioux tribes requires that tribe continue to maintain criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians).
1987] 235
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B. Organization of Modern Indian Courts
The flagship tribal judicial system, pre-eminent because of
its size, is that of the Navajo Nation. With several divisions
and a fully staffed Supreme Court, the Navajo Tribal Courts
process over 45,000 cases per year.19 In contrast, some tribal
jurisdictions are part-time operations with a docket of no more
than 100 cases per year. A recent development in the Indian
judiciary is the establishment of inter-tribal systems designed
to efficiently serve several reservations.20 Indian courts serv-
ing more than one tribe now operate in western Washington,
Oklahoma, and on some of the Sioux Reservations. These sys-
tems provide some trial services and require that each partici-
pating tribe submit its appellate matters to an inter-tribal
appellate forum.
Of the more than 1000 people now working in the Indian
courts, an overwhelming number are Indians. In the past dec-
ade tribal councils have moved away from the practice of
appointing local, non-Indian lawyers to tribal judgeships. The
prevalence of Indians on the tribal bench is partially due to the
availability of legally trained Indians has increased substan-
tially in recent years.2' The efforts of the American Indian
Lawyer Training Program, of Oakland, California; the Indian
Law Center at the University of New Mexico; and the federal
Legal Services Corporation, which provides legal aid services
to Indians on many reservations have resulted in a rapid
increase in the sophistication of the Indian Courts. Most tribal
judges now have some college training and many have law
degrees and are members of state and tribal bar associations.22
After appointment to the bench, Indian judges receive
extensive legal education services from the National American
19. In fiscal year 1985, the Navajo Courts processed 21,823 criminal, 20,007 traffic,
2,168 civil, 31 appellate, and 2,182 juvenile cases for a total of 46,129 cases. Statistical
Report of the Navajo Courts (1985). Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics indicate that
approximately 185,000 cases were filed in all Indian courts during Fiscal Year 1985.
20. See "The Northwest Intertribal Court System," 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. B-67 (1979).
21. In 1960, the number of Native American law school graduates active in the
United States was 44. In 1970, the number had risen to 288 and by 1980, to 999.
Statistics derived from U.S. Bureau of Census data by the American Bar Association
and Professor Leonard Rabinowitz of Northwestern University School of Law (on file
with author).
22. Letter of March 10, 1987, from Roland Johnson, Chief, Division of Tribal
Government Services, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affiars (on file with author) (BIA
provides training to 600 judges and court personnel); 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (3) and (4)
(Indian Civil Rights Act requires legal training for judges and court personnel).
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Indian Court Judges Association.23 The Judges Association has
been providing training for judges and staff, bench books, and
manuals for almost twenty years.2" Through the National
Indian Justice Center at Petaluma, California, the Judges
Association provides regional training sessions for judges and
court personnel on a broad range of topics.2" A certification
program for tribal judges and a standardized system for court
management is also being developed.
C. Types of Indian Courts
Most Indian courts now in operation are "tribal courts."26
The majority of their powers are derived from the sovereignty
of the tribes. Tribal courts may be established by a provision
in the tribal constitution but are more often organized by an
act of the tribal legislature incorporated into the tribal code.
Their codes and procedural rules are adopted by the tribal leg-
islature. The law of the United States has long recognized that
tribes have the inherent sovereign authority to organize
courts.2 Tribal sovereign authority can, however, be limited
or removed by Congress.28
The second type of Indian court, called a "Court of Indian
Offenses," is set up and maintained by the Secretary of the
Interior,29 to provide law and justice on the reservation. The
extent to which the Courts of Indian Offenses are to be consid-
ered federal instrumentalities is an open question.30
23. Various publications of the National Indian Justice Center, located at Number
7, 4th Street, Petaluma, California 94952.
24. 1&
25. Id.
26. According to Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics, 127 tribal courts and 19
Courts of Indian Offenses are now in operation. Budget Proposal, United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, at 77 (Fiscal Year 1986).
27. Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Navajo Rptr. at 160 (tribal court exercises inherent
jurisdiction of the tribe subject to control of the tribal legislature).
28. Muskogee (Creek) Nation v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 13 Interior Bd. Indian
App. 211, 213-14, 92 Interior Dec. 309, 314 (1985) (the general civil and criminal judicial
authority of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation abolished by Congress).
29. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888) (the President of the United
States, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, has the general power under the
federal statutes to establish Courts of Indian Offenses and provide for their
jurisdiction).
30. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 n.28 (1978). But see Begay v.
Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 385-86, 222 P.2d 624, 628 (1950) (Navajo court is not a federal court
when exercising tribal domestic relations jurisdiction); see also Memorandum from the
Deputy assistant Secretary of the United States Dep't of the Interior - Indian Affairs
(Nov. 12, 1985) (C.F.R. courts are federal agencies) [on file with the author].
1987]
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Courts of Indian Offenses are often called "CFR" courts31
because the code which they enforce is located in Part 11 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. A substantial revision of Part 11
of the Code is now being circulated in draft.32 The revision,
for the first time, contains a children's code, a probate code,
and a domestic relations code. The revision also provides for
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to pro-
ceedings in the CFR courts.33 The adoption of a tribal code by
the tribal legislature causes the abolition of most of the appli-
cable provisions of the CFR,34 but the adoption of a tribal code
does not necessarily result in the dissolution of the CFR court
in favor of a tribal court. Thus, a CFR court may operate
under a tribal code or enforce Part 11 as a criminal code and
utilize tribal ordinances as civil and regulatory law.
D. Law Applied in the Indian Courts
The existing provisions of Part 11 of the CFR are limited
to a criminal code, with a few provisions for the trial of civil
suits. By its terms the CFR civil code provisions of the CFR
applies only to Indians unless non-Indians stipulate to the
jurisdiction of the CFR court.3 ' Because the scope of jurisdic-
tion provided by the CFR is so narrow, most tribes that have
retained the CFR provisions have substantially revised it by
adopting supplementary tribal statutes. More commonly, tribal
governments have elected to dissolve the CFR court and
organize tribal courts under the tribe's own constitution and
code. Tribal codes that replace the CFR procedural provisions
and generally contain familiar criminal and civil rules of proce-
dure, definitions of criminal offenses, a juvenile and child wel-
fare code, and a fish and game code. In recent years, some
tribal councils have been active in adding regulatory chapters
to their codes resulting in tribal statutory schemes which are
substantially more comprehensive than those existing on reser-
31. Kiowa Business Committee v. Ware, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-45, A-45 (Ct. Indian
Offenses 1980) ("The plaintiffs... filed this action in the Court of Indian Offenses, a
C.F.R. Court."). 25 C.F.R. § 11.000 et seq. (1985).
32. 50 Fed. Reg. 43235 (1985).
33. Id
34. 25 CFR § 11.1(d).
35. Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D. S.D. 1975) (tribal
court may assert jurisdiction if non-member defendants agree to tribal court
jurisdiction in written instrument). See also 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1986).
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vations just a few years ago.
Litigants appearing in an Indian court should pay careful
attention to sections of the applicable code dealing with the
establishment of the court and the statutory limitations on its
jurisdiction. These provisions vary from tribe to tribe and are
to a significant extent based upon the unique history of the
tribe. It cannot be assumed that the constitutional and statu-
tory powers of all Indian courts are the same. The powers of
Indian tribes to expel persons from their reservations, to con-
trol certain behavior of their members outside the reservation,
and to raise sovereign immunity as a defense to any suit
against the tribe are often governed by provisions of the code.
The lack of a code provision in a specific area does not mean
that the tribal court may not exercise inherent jurisdiction in
that area of the law. In general, it is the prerogative of the
tribal court to interpret tribal statutes.3 8
Learning the law of any new jurisdiction usually involves
going beyond statutes and regulations set out in its code.
Indian jurisdictions are similar in this regard with the added
complication of tribal court reliance in some cases on custom-
ary and traditional law. Many tribal codes contain procedures
for obtaining and presenting evidence regarding customary and
traditional practices or beliefs that may be given the weight of
law in the Indian court. While the enforcement of unwritten
customary law may seem exotic to modem practitioners in
these times of extensive codification, customary law has an
accepted place in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 39 Even on a
reservation where the tribal code does not refer to customary
law, it is wise to seek information about the use of tribal cus-
tomary law and how it may be applied to a case before the
36. Burlington Northern v. Dep't. of Pub. Serv. Regulation, - Mont. -, -, 720
P.2d 267, 268 (1986) (tribe adopted a common carrier statute regulating railroads).
37. Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 240, 244, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977) (tribal court had
exclusive jurisdiction over dispute involving possession of land within reservation
despite the fact that the tribal code did not contain an explicit remedy).
38. R. J. Williams v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985) (interpretation of tribal law is the duty of the tribal
court). See Committee To Save Our Constitution v. United States, No. CIV-83-3011,
slip op. at 4, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 3035, 3035-36 (D.S.D. 1984) (tribal court ruling must be
accepted by federal officials and federal court as the law of the tribe).
39. See 21A AM. JUR. 2D Customs and Usages § 1 (1981); see also In re Adoption
of Doe, 89 N.M. App. 606, 620, 555 P.2d 906, 917 (1976) (Navajo custom to be recognized
by state courts).
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court.4 0
Unfortunate results may arise from assuming that uncodi-
fied customs which govern tribal life on modern reservations
will not be applied by the court.4 For example, the American
concept of responsibility for damage caused by negligence and
the defeat or mitigation of such responsibility by contributory
or comparative negligence defenses is foreign to basic concepts
of justice as understood by some tribes. On these reservations,
customary law permits no excuse and requires payment for
injuries by the party most responsible for the injury.'
Tribal courts will generally follow their own precedents
and give considerable weight to the decisions of other Indian
courts. Finding those precedents requires diligence. While the
Indian Law Reporter4 3 includes many tribal court opinions,
written tribal case law tends to be sparse. Only the Navajo
courts publish a reporter." Most tribal codes attempt to han-
40. Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Navajo. Rptr. 9, 12 (1980) (tribal court authorized to
apply state law only when no tradition or custom is available).
41. Tom v. Tom, 4 Navajo Rptr. 12, 13 (1983) (customary law of Navajo people
requires father to support his children); Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 190,
1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-70, A-71 (1978) (venue dependent on traditional clan home of
defendant, not actual residence). Accord In the Matter of the Estates of Charley Nez
Wauneka Sr., 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6049, 6049 (1986) customary law controls distribution
of real property obtained by customary usage, even if custom conflicts with tribal
probate code); In the Matter of the Interest of J.J.S., a Minor, 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 195
(D. Window Rock 1983) (customary or common law of the Navajo people will
determine who, among two petitioners, is entitled to adopt an abandoned Navajo
child); see also Adoption of S.C.M., a Kwakiutl Indian, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 179 (D.
Window Rock 1983) (in the Navajo Nation, customary law and common law are the
same and distribution of property belonging to deceased shall take place according to
Navajo common law); Apache v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2 Navajo Rptr. 250, 252
(D. Window Rock 1982) (Navajo customary law may be noticed by the court as an
adjudicated fact and may be applied to commercial transactions and the tribal court is
required to apply customary law); Hepler v. Perkins, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6011, 6016
(Sitka Community Ass'n Tribal Ct. 1986) (clan membership flowing through female
members of clan determines jurisdiction of tribal court over juveniles in child welfare
matters). Cf. 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.23, 11.27, 11.29 (1985).
42. See Makah Tribe v. Clallarn County, 73 Wash. 2d 677, 684-85, 440 P.2d 442, 447
(1968) (tribal custom to be recognized and enforced in state court). Compare Howard
v. Sharp, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6027, 6028 (Colo. River Tribal Ct. 1983) (comparative
negligence standard adopted by tribal court) with Boren v. Victorino, No. 12-ATC-7940
(Acoma Pueblo Tribal Ct. May 14, 1980) (contributory negligence not a part of the
customary law of the Pueblo and would not bar plaintiff's recovery).
43. In 1979 and 1980 the American Indian Lawyer Training Program published the
Tribal Court Reporter [Tribal Ct. Rptr.]. In 1983 the Tribal Court Reporter was
absorbed into the Indian Law Reporter [Indian L. Rptr.] also published by the
American Indian Lawyer Training Program. Thus, a mode for publishing tribal court
opinions is available, but it is not always used.
44. The Navajo Reporter is published by the Courts of the Navajo Nation at
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dle the problems created by the lack of a large body of decided
case law by explicitly establishing, in a ranked order of applica-
bility, certain bodies of law that the court will apply to all
cases coming before it. 45  While the creation of a system for
publishing all important tribal decisions is in its early stages,
litigants in the Indian courts should directly question court
clerks, advocates, administrators and judges about prior deci-
sions of the court that may be applicable to their case.46
IV. JURISDICTION
A. Exclusive Tribal Jurisdiction
Under some circumstances it is necessary to file actions in
an Indian court because no other court may exercise jurisdic-
tion over the matter. Tribal jurisdiction may be exclusive in
actions involving the activities of Indians, Indian tribes and
their enterprises, property and agencies within an Indian res-
ervation. The general theory on which such exclusive jurisdic-
tion is based provides that tribal Indians are entitled to make
their own laws and be ruled by them, and that the imposition
of state or federal jurisdiction on activities within tribal terri-
tory would weaken the authority of Indian courts and legisla-
tures.47  Failure to utilize the Indian forum where such
Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Arizona. The Navajo Reporter contains all major
opinions of the trial and appellate courts of the Navajo Nation since 1969. It is now in
its fifth volume.
45. Manygoats v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 4 Navajo. Rptr. 94, 96 (1983)
(where tribal court is directed by tribal statutes to apply "any laws of the United
States which may be applicable," tribal court will make independent determination of
the meaning of the federal law using federal and state interpretations of the law as a
guide). Cf Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Navajo Rptr. 9, 10 (1980) (specific ranking of sources
of law to be applied by Navajo court included in Navajo code); Crow Tribe Housing
Auth. v. Little Horn State Bank, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6029, 6031 (Crow Tribal Ct. 1986)
(absent Crow Tribal law, tribal court is free to adopt any body of law); COLVILLE
TRIBAL CODE § 4.1.11 (1980) ("In all cases the court shall apply, in the following order
of priority unless superseded by a specific section of the Law and Order Code, any
applicable laws of the Colville Confederated Tribes, tribal case law, state common law,
federal statutes, federal common law and international law.").
46. A short list of major sources of Indian law includes: F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1982); see also W. CANBY, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, (1982); S.
PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS (1982). Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1985); 25 C.F.R. § 1 et
seq. (1985); 19 FED. PROC. L. ED. §§ 46.1-46.1094 (1983).
47. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (where defendant was Indian and
activity occurred on reservation, tribal court jurisdiction was exclusive forum, and use
of state court processes was violation of civil rights of Indian defendant). See also
United States v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F. Supp. 474, 477 (D. Mont. 1965) (tribal
Indians are permitted to govern themselves and their territory and federal or state law
is allowed to intrude only where Congress has clearly granted authority to federal or
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jurisdiction is exclusive can render the actions of non-Indian
courts and agencies void and unenforceable.48
Where the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction, that jurisdiction
generally cannot be defeated by invoking federal diversity
jurisdiction.49 Until recently the decisions of the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits appeared to be in conflict on the matter of
diversity jurisdiction. However, the Eighth Circuit now has
conformed its rule to that of the Ninth.' ° The Tenth Circuit
also has followed the Ninth Circuit rule and preserves tribal
jurisdiction against claims of diversity jurisdiction.51 Exclusive
tribal jurisdiction is also not defeated by filing an action
against the Department of the Interior, hoping to invoke fed-
eral administrative remedies. 2
state officials); Peterson v. District Court, - P.2d -, -, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 4053, 4055
(Wyo. 1980) (tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction in collision between an auto driven
by an Indian and a horse owned by an Indian on a U.S. Highway); Arviso v. Dahozy, 3
Navajo Rptr. 84, 84 (1982) (where parties to a marriage are enrolled Indians residing
on a reservation, tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction); Frejo v. Barney, 3 Navajo
Rptr. 233, 234 (D. Window Rock 1982) (when parties to an action are Indian, tribal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction).
48. McKenzie County Social Serv. Bd. v. V.G., 392 N.W.2d 399, 402 (N.D. 1986)
(tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine paternity matters when child and
mother reside on reservation and alleged father is member of tribe). Estate of James
Wermy Pekah, 13 Interior Bd. Indian App. 264, 266 (1985) (since state court acted
without jurisdiction to order adopting of reservation Indian, state court order was null
and void).
49. Superior Oil v. Merritt, 619 F. Supp. 526, 533 (D. Ut. 1985) (Congress did not
intend diversity statute to limit tribal sovereignty by depriving Indian courts of
exclusive jurisdiction over reservation based disputes); see also F. COHEN, supra note
43, at 317.
50. See, e.g., Weeks Construction, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, 797 F.2d
688 (8th Cir. 1986). The general rule in most federal circuits is that a federal court will
not accept jurisdiction in cases diversity when Indian court jurisdiction is likely. Two
reasons have been asserted. First, federal diversity jurisdiction is derivative of state
court jurisdiction and state courts do not have jurisdiction in most cases involving
Indians or Indian property within a reservation. Second, where tribal laws and
customs or actions of tribal governments or their agencies are at issue the courts have
found that federal interpretation would be a direct interference with tribal
government and the prerogatives of the Indian courts.
51. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.. v. LaPlante, 107 S.Ct. 971, 982 (1987)
(notwithstanding provisions of federal diversity statute, civil jurisdiction over activities
of non-Indians on reservation land presumptively lies in tribal courts); see also
Superior Oil v. Merritt, 619 F. Supp. at 553.
52. See Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe R.R. v. Deputy Area Director, 14 Interior
Bd. Indian App. 46, 51, 93 Interior Dec. 79, 85 (1986) (Board is not the proper forum to
challenge tribal tax law as being violative of the Indian Civil Rights Act). See also
Poncho v. Coushatta Tribe, 14 Interior Bd. Indian App. 26, 29 (1986) (Board has no
jurisdiction over decisions rendered by tribal officials in matters committed to the
tribe); Redfield v. Area Director, 13 Interior Bd. Indian App. 365, 366, 13 Indian L.
Rptr. 7009, 7010 (1985) (Board is not a proper forum to challenge an Indian Tribe's
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B. Jurisdiction Over Indians and Indian Property
An Indian court can be described as a court of general
jurisdiction53 when that jurisdiction is applied to the activities
of Indians on all lands within the boundaries of an Indian res-
ervation or on Indian trust land outside of any reservation; i.e.
in the "Indian country".' The territorial, personal, and sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of an Indian court is established by fed-
eral law, the tribal constitution, tribal customary law and the
tribal code.55
Outside the reservation, Indians are generally subject to
state and federal law.56 However, when Indians are on Indian
trust land outside reservation, or exercise certain rights pro-
tected by federal agreement or treaty, or belong to a certain
class of Indian children, tribal governments may subject them
interpretation of its own resolutions); Hawley Lake Homeowners Ass'n. v. Deputy
Ass't. Secretary - Indian Affairs, 13 Interior Bd. Indian App. 276, 278-79, 12 Indian L.
Rptr. 7043, 7045 (1985) (lease dispute between tribe and its lesee within exclsuive
jurisdiction of tribal court, divesting both the Board and the Bureau of Indian Affiars
of jurisdiction). Accord Benally v. Navajo Area Director, 9 Interior Bd. Indian App.
284, 286, 89 Interior Dec. 252, 256 (1982) (tribal candidate for election denied appeal to
Secretary of Interior because tribal law allowing such appeal had been repealed and
Secretary had no independent authority).
53. Moses v. Joseph, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51, A-52 (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. 1980)
(unless specific tribal statute limits its powers, tribal court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the cases brought before it).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949) (although statute deals directly with criminal
jurisdiction, federal courts have found that it defines scope of Indian country for the
purpose of establishing civil jurisdiction); Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425, 427 n.2 (1975) (Supreme Court has recognized that § 1151 generally applies to
questions of civil jurisdiction); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1078 n.15
(D. Utah 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (District court
ruled that § 1151 applies to questions of civil jurisdiction). See also Sandoval v. Tinian,
Inc., 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6041, 6043 (D. Crownpoint 1986) (Indian court has jurisdiction
to entertain action against non-Indian that arose outside reservation, but within Indian
country and dependent Indian community). But see General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Chischilly, 96 N.M. 113, 116, 628 P.2d 683, 685 (1981) (U.S. Supreme Court's
assertion that 25 U.S.C. § 1151 defines civil jurisdiction in Indian country found
unacceptable by state court).
55. Cf. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 95 (8th Cir. 1956) (tribal
courts have inherent jurisdiction over all matters not removed from their jurisdiction
by federal government, and federal statutes and regulations support authority of tribal
courts); Treho v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 113, 115 (D. Nev. 1978) (Indian court has
jurisdiction on all parts of reservation including individual Indian allotments); Leon v.
Numkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 310-11, 689 P.2d 566, 568 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (subject matter
jurisdiction in divorce action is conferred on Indian court by the tribal constitution and
code).
56. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973) ("Absent express
federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have
generally been held subject to non- discriminatory state law... ").
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to the jurisdiction of the Indian court even when their activi-
ties take place outside the reservation."
Indian courts are usually prohibited from exercising juris-
diction over agents of the federal government, whether the
agents are Indian or non-Indian, when such agents are
involved in official business on the reservation and the exer-
cise of tribal jurisdiction over them would interfere with duties
imposed by federal law.58 This rule does not, however, apply to
state agents. The tribe may utilize its exclusionary jurisdiction
to prevent state agents from acting on the reservation even
when the state agent might have authority to act under state
law.5
9
Criminal activities of Indians on the reservation are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Indian court except as limited by
the tribal code and constitution and the provisions of the
Indian Civil Rights Act.60  In some criminal matters Indian
court jurisdiction is exclusive.61 Pursuant to the Indian Civil
Rights Act, however, an Indian court may not criminally pun-
ish by a fine larger than $5000.00 or a jail sentence longer than
one year for any one offense.62  This limitation relates to sen-
57. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (tribe had treaty right
to criminally enforce off-reservation fishing regulations). See also United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 340-41 (tribe has right to regulate treaty-protected
fisheries outside reservation). Cf. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63; F.
COHEN, supra note 43, at 347-48 ("outside Indian country tribal courts can have
jurisdiction based on tribal membership...").
58. United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986) (tribal court
lacks jurisdiction to enjoin federal employee from carrying out official duties on
reservation). Accord Armstrong v. United States, 306 F.2d 520, 522-23 (10th Cir. 1962)
(Indian courts have no jurisdiction to scrutinize activities of government agents
lawfully upon reservation); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 604 F.
Supp. 464, 466 (D. Ariz. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986) (tribal courts have no
authority to restrict federal employees conducting official business on reservation);
United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 364 F. Supp. 192, 195, aff'd on rehearing, 369 F. Supp.
562, 565 (D. Mont. 1973) (tribal courts have no in rem jurisdiction over federal agents
seizing gambling equipment on reservation). But see Donovan v. Navajo Products
Industries, 692 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1982) (federal OSHA inspectors can be lawfully
excluded from Navajo lands).
59. People v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 424 F. Supp. 969, 977 (S.D. Cal. 1977)
(state game agents have authority to enforce state law while on reservation, but tribe
may lawfully exclude agents from reservation making enforcement impossible). See
also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1983) (tribal
jurisdiction sufficient to provide tribe with exclusive power to exclude state from
regulating hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation lands).
60. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-26 (1986).
61. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (generally tribal
courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over crimes between Indians).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1986), as amended by Public Law 98-570 § 4217 (1986).
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tencing and not to the nature of the crimes which may be
charged and punished in the tribal court. For example, even
with this sentencing limitation, an Indian court has jurisdiction
to try an Indian on a charge of manslaughter, but the maxi-
mum penalty on conviction would be one year in jail and/or a
$5000.00 fine. Furthermore, a sentence totaling more than one
year may result from convictions on several separate charges.
Such sentence "stacking" is not prohibited by the Indian Civil
Rights Act. 3
Matters involving the probate of property held in trust for
Indians by the United States are handled exclusively by special
Department of the Interior administrative law courts. 4
Indian courts may handle the probate of non-trust, real and
personal property.65 Tribes may exercise their powers of emi-
nent domain through their courts' and may not take property
without providing fair compensation and due process of law.67
Indian courts, like state courts, may not directly affect the
ownership of trust lands.68  Under certain circumstances, how-
ever, an Indian court can affect transfers of trust assets from
Indians where the tribal court has jurisdiction over the person
of the Indian. 9 A panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently found that an Indian court may be the only court with
jurisdiction to foreclose a mortgage on Indian trust lands made
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 483a.7 ° Under the rule announced by the
63. Ramos v. Pyramid Tribal Court, 621 F. Supp. 967, 969, (D. Nev. 1985)
(defendant convicted of seven offenses receives sentence of two years).
64. 25 U.S.C. §§ 371-80 (1986).
65. Estate of Navajo Joe, 4 Navajo Rptr. 99, 99 (1983) (tribal court has jurisdiction
over probate of grazing permit for 50 sheep units).
66. Seneca Constitution Rights Organization v. George, 348 F. Supp. 48, 51
(W.D.N.Y. 1972) (tribe had sovereign authority to exercise powers of eminent domain
over Indian land).
67. Dennison v. Tucson Gas and Electric Co., 1 Navajo Rptr. 95, 96 (1974) (Navajo
Tribe has power of eminent domain but may not exercise the power without providing
due process of law and just compensation for property taken).
68. Fredericks v. Mandel, 650 F.2d 144, 146 (8th Cir. 1981) (tribal court lacks
jurisdiction to determine title to Indian trust allotments); Benally v. John, 4 Navajo
Rptr. 39, 43-44 (1983) (while United States has exclusive right to determine title to
allotted trust lands, tribal court had jurisdiction to determine whether a transfer of an
allotment was coercive or fraudulent and the power to provide a remedy for such an
unlawful transfer); Colorado River Tribes v. Anderson, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6001, 6002
(Colo. River Tribal Ct. 1984) (action in tribal court seeking title to allotment dismissed
on grounds that United States is indispensable party and cannot be joined).
69. Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 182-83 (8th Cir. 1978) (tribal court has
jurisdiction to dispose of property of an Indian marriage, real or personal).
70. Northwest South Dakota Prod. Credit Assn. v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 326-27 (8th
Cir. 1986) (federal court lacks jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage on Indian lands
1987]
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Eighth Circuit, federal courts have not been granted the requi-
site jurisdiction to foreclose on Indian lands and state courts,
even when the Indian land is located on a reservation subject
Public Law 83-280, lack jurisdiction.71
Some courts have found that Indian tribes may cede court
jurisdiction over the actions of Indians within a reservation to
a state by making an express provision for such a cession in the
tribal code.72 The better rule, however, is that pursuant to
federal law7 3 such a cession violates the federal scheme for
transfer of jurisdiction and is therefore void;7 4 and, state court
actions taken without jurisdiction are void and unenforce-
able.7 5 Because a tribal code contains no provision for a specific
form of action does not mean that the tribe has surrendered
this jurisdiction to the state. Rather, when the tribe acts by
legislation to assert jurisdiction, any state jurisdiction which
obtained pursuant to 25 USC § 483a; state court also lacks jurisdiction; tribal court has
exclusive jurisdiction).
71. Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133, 135-36 (D. Mont. 1971)
(security interest on reservation land does not imply state court jurisdiction). See also
Crow Tribe v. Deernose, - Mont. -, -, 487 P.2d 1133, 1135-36 (1971) (state court lacks
jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage on Indian lands obtained pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
§ 483a (1983)). Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1956) (nothing in section shall confer
jurisdiction on state court to adjudicate property interests). As to the effect of Public
Law 83-280, see supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
72. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1974) (tribal code which explicitly
disclaims jurisdiction over certain subject matter permitted state court to exercise
jurisdiction). See Kuykendall v. Tim's Buick, 149 Ariz. 465, 719 P.2d 1081 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985) (tribal code provision eschewing jurisdiction over disputes between non-
tribal members allows state to assert jurisdiction); see also Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379
N.W.2d 139, 142-43 (Minn. App. 1985) (rules of tribal court requiring enforcement of
state custody orders relinquished tribal jurisdiction over child custody to state).
73. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1326 (1983).
74. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold, 106 S. Ct.
2305, 2312 (1986) (state's exclusion of Indians from its courts was inconsistent with
federal scheme for granting Indian jurisdiction to states and, therefore, preempted by
federal law). See also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 426-27 (1971) (because
Montana had not accepted Congressional offer of Indian jurisdiction, state courts did
not have jurisdiction over reservation Indians); Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 434-35,
568 P.2d 1, 5 (1976) (because Arizona had not acted to accept jurisdiction under Public
Law 83-280, its courts lacked jurisdiction over reservation Indians).
75. McKenzie County Social Serv. Bd. v. V.G., 392 N.W.2d 399, 402 (N.D. 1986)
(state court order finding Indian to be father of child, void for lack of state court
jurisdiction). Accord Estate of James Wermy Pekah, 13 Interior Bd. Indian App. 264,
266 (1985) (adoption decree at issue in Indian probate proceeding invalid because it was
rendered by a state court lacking jurisdiction).
76. Joe v. Marcum, 621 F.2d 358, 361-62 (10th Cir. 1980) (tribe is permitted to
choose whether to allow certain forms of action in its courts; refusal does not
surrender jurisdiction to state courts); see also Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 240, 244, 561
P.2d 476, 479 (1977).
1987] Modern Practice In Indian Courts 247
has been asserted is preempted.77 The incorporation into the
tribal law of state or federal substantive law through reference
to such sources of law in the tribal code does not grant juris-
diction to state or federal institutions.78
C. Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians
Federal law, tribal codes, or tribal constitutions may limit
the jurisdictions of Indian courts over non-Indians acting
within the reservation.79 For instance, Indian courts, without a
federal delegation of authority to do so, may not try non-Indi-
ans for criminal offenses.8 0 In addition, Indian courts under
77. Johnson v. Dixon, 4 Navajo Rptr. 108, 109-10 (1983) (when Indian Nation
enters a field of legislation, state jurisdiction is preempted); see also County of Vilas v.
Chapman, 122 Wis. 2d 211, 214-15, 361 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1985) (when tribe enacts
legislation taking jurisdiction on reservation, state jurisdiction is preempted). Accord
Wildcatt v. Smith, 69 N.C. App. 1, 8, 316 S.E.2d 870, 877, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 5026, 5030
(1984) (assertion of state jurisdiction after creation of tribal court would infringe on
tribal sovereignty).
78. R.J. Williams v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth. 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983)
(tribal code incorporating state law by reference did not cause actions taken under
tribal code to be considered under color of state law). Accord Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d
819, 821-22 (11th Cir. 1962) (when Navajo Tribe adopted C.F.R. provisions, provisions
became tribal law and were no longer considered federal law); Nelson v. Dubois, 232
N.W.2d 54, 57-58 (N.D. 1975) (state motor vehicle code incorporated by reference into
tribal code did not cede jurisdiction to state); Boyer v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 92
Idaho 257, 261-62, 441 P.2d 167, 170 (1968) (code of law adopted by tribe is tribal, not
federal law). See also Wauneka v. Campbell, 22 Ariz. App. 287, 293, 526 P.2d 1085, 1089
(1974) (tribal statute requiring possession of state driver's license did not cede traffic
jurisdiction to state). Cf. Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 385-86, 222 P.2d 624, 628 (1950)
(marriage license issued by state does not grant state court jurisdiction over divorce of
Navajo Indians).
79. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1986) (limiting C.F.R. Court jurisdiction to Indians
and those who stipulate to Indian jurisdiction) with Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d
408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976) (tribal jurisdiction limited by tribal law to members of the
tribe).
80. This is not to say that Indian police officers may not arrest non-Indians. But
see, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978). (limiting tribal court
ability to try non-Indians). See also Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179-
80 (9th Cir. 1975) (power to exclude from the reservation includes power to detain and
determine whether grounds for exclusion exist); Ryder v. State 98 N.M. 316, 319, 648
P.2d 773, 774-75 (1982) (Indian officer had power to stop and detain non-Indian under
federal and state statutes). Cf. Jurisdiction Over Offenses by Non-Indians in Indian
Country, Op. Solicitor Dept. Interior (April 10, 1978). It has not been determined
whether a C.F.R. Court could exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Compare
25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1986) (criminal jurisdiction of C.F.R. Courts limited to Indians) with
I Op. Solicitor Dept. Interior 872 (1939) (Dept. of Interior could delegate to Indian
courts criminal jurisdiction over "Indians" that are not members of any tribe). A bill
was recently introduced in the United States Senate to provide the Pima-Maricopa
Tribal Court with certain criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. To Provide For The
Proper Administration Of Justice Within The Salt River Pima Maricopa Reservation
By Granting Jurisdiction To The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Over
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some circumstances, may not exercise civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians acting on the reservation, when those activities
occur on lands to which Indian title has been extinguished.8'
This rule regarding assertion of civil jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans acting on fee lands has several exceptions. Indian courts
may impose civil jurisdiction on non-Indians: when Congress
has delegated to the tribes power to regulate non-Indian
behavior; 2 when a non-Indian has entered into consensual
relationships with Indians or the tribe; 3 or where the activi-
ties of a non-Indian on fee patented lands within a reservation
have an impact on tribal health, safety, or economic security.'
The result of these rather broad exceptions is that tribal courts
have generally found that in civil matters arising on the reser-
vation, they may assert jurisdiction over non-Indians.8 5
The provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act, as well as
tribal constitutional and code provisions, protect the rights of
Certain Criminal Misdemeanor Offenses: Hearings on S. 2564 Before the Select Comm
on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986).
81. United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (tribal courts have no
jurisdiction to regulate hunting or fishing on non-Indian land on the Crow
Reservation).
82. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1976) (United States lawfully
delegated some authority to Indian tribes for regulation of liquor sales on reservation).
Accord Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1981)
(delegation by agency to tribe authority to regulate air quality Constitutional even
though tribal authority would be exercised over non-Indians); United States v.
Morgan, 614 F.2d 166, 171 (8th Cir. 1980) (tribal court may exercise jurisdiction over
non-Indians under direct delegation by Congress). See also Washington Dept. of
Ecology v. Environmental Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1464, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (tribal
governments should participate in hazardous waste management). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1161
(1984) (Indian liquor laws inapplicable in non-Indian country); 30 U.S.C. § 1300 (1986)
(Secretary shall make study regarding surface mining on Indian land); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1983) (air quality and emission statutes).
83. Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (tribe may
impose tax on sales to non-Indians who enter into consensual relationships with
Indians on its reservation); see also Sandoval v. Tinian, Inc., 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6041,
6043 (D. Crownpoint 1986) (tribal court may assert jurisdiction over non- Indians who
enter into business relationships with Indians on Indian land).
84. Ashcroft v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 679 F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 1982) (Indian tribe
retains sovereign power to protect tribal self-government and control internal
relations on non-Indian fee lands with reservation, including power to regulate
commerce with tribal members); see also United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64.
85. Window Rock Mall v. Day IV, 3 Navajo Rptr. 58, 59 (1981) (non-Indian
corporation doing business within Navajo Nation is subject to jurisdiction of Navajo
courts in dispute over sublease); Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Navajo Rptr. 159, 160 (1982)
(any person doing injury within Navajo Nation is subject to jurisdiction of Navajo
courts). Cf. Keith v. Allred, 3 Navajo Rptr. 191, 193 (D. Chinle 1981) (non-Indian is not
injured by Navajo court's assertion of jurisdiction).
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non-Indians who are before the Indian courts.8 For example,
the plaintiffs in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,8 7 the seminal
case that defined the scope of the Indian Civil Rights Act, were
persons seeking enrollment in a tribe. Their lack of enrolled
status made them, by definition, non-Indians. The Supreme
Court found the remedy of these non-Indian plaintiffs to be in
a tribal forum.88
D. Concurrent Jurisdiction: Public Law 83-280 and the
Indian Courts
Enacted in 1953, Public Law 83-28089 granted certain states
some jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country. The impact
of this legislation on the jurisdiction of Indian courts has long
86. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. at 211-12; see also supra note 85.
87. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
88. A number of recent cases have found the activities of non-Indians to be subject
to Indian jurisdiction. See United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64 (activities
affecting tribal health, safety, and economic security). See also Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1985) (Indian tribe may levy tax on non-
Indian companies removing minerals from Indian lands, even when tax has not been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983) (tribal civil jurisdiction sufficient to provide tribe with
jurisdiction over non-Indians hunting and fishing on reservation); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribes, 455 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1982) (Indian tribe may tax non-Indian company
producing oil and gas removed from Indian land); Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (tribe may tax sales to non-Indians
on reservation); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557 (tribe could control liquor
sales). See generally, R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th
Cir. 1983) (tribal court has jurisdiction over contract dispute between tribal housing
authority and non-Indian contractor); Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe, 715 F.2d
486 (10th Cir. 1983) (tribe has jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by non-
Indians, exclusive of state); Babbit Ford v. Navajo Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983)
(tribe may enforce repossession statute against non-Indians on reservation); Snow v.
Quinalt Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1983) (tribe may tax business engaging
in commercial activity with Indians within reservation); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671
F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1981) (tribe may enforce health and building regulations); Knight v.
Shoshone & Arapaho Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982) (land use regulations);
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982) (tribe
may regulate riparian rights in navigable water); Nance v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (clean air regulation); Williams v. Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe, 625 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Nev. 1986) (jurisdiction in tort actions); Sechrist v.
Quinalt Indian Nation, No. C76-823M, 9 Indian L. Rptr. 3064 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 1982)
(zoning and land use regulations extend to non-Indian lands within reservation);
Lummi Tribe v. Hallaver, No. C79-682R, 9 Indian L. Rptr. 3025 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5,
1982) (tribe has exclusive authority to operate sewer system on reservation); Thomsen
v. King County, 39 Wash. App. 505, 694 P.2d 40, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 5012 (1985)
(jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee patented lands with reservation); Leon v.
Numkena, 142 Ariz. App. 307, 689 P.2d 566, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 5068 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984) (marriage of Indian to non-Indian and custody of children).
89. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1976).
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been a concern of tribal governments. This concern is espe-
cially great in states, such as Washington, where this statute
constantly raises questions regarding the scope of state juris-
diction on the reservations.
The Indian jurisdiction assumed by states under Public
Law 83-280 has been found not to exclude tribal jurisdiction.
To date, all federal rulings on this issue conclude that tribal
and state jurisdiction are concurrent in those areas affected by
Public Law 83-280.9" In a landmark case dealing with the scope
of Public Law 83-280 jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did not
decide the question.9 ' On remand, however, the district court
said: "The jurisdiction exercised by the State of Washington
over the plaintiff (Yakima Nation) and its members is concur-
rent with the jurisdiction of the Yakima Nation over its own
members."92 Further support for the rule is found in a recent
Alaska ruling that while Public Law 83-280 excluded federal
court jurisdiction from causes of action governed by its provi-
sions, state and tribal jurisdiction over these same causes of
action is concurrent.93
The reasoning of these federal opinions is based on the his-
toric dual nature of federal-tribal jurisdiction.94 Prior to the
enactment of Public Law 83-280, reservation Indians were sub-
ject to the concurrent jurisdiction of two separate sovereigns:
the United States and the tribal government of the specific res-
ervation.95 When Congress enacted Public Law 83-280, it said
nothing about dissolving tribal sovereignty or tribal jurisdic-
90. Yakima Nation v. Washington, No. 2732 (E.D. Wash. May 18, 1981) (tribe has
concurrent jurisdiction over its members where state has asserted jurisdiction over
Indians under Public Law 83-280). Accord Colville Confederated Tribes v. Beck, No.
C78-76, 6 Indian L. Rptr. F-8 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 18, 1978) (concurrent criminal
jurisdiction); State v. Michael, 729 P.2d 405 (Idaho 1986) (tribal court may have
concurrent jurisdiction with state court on reservation subject to Pub. L. 83-280). See
also Regarding Criminal Jurisdiction on the Seminole Reservation in Florida, Op.
Solicitor Dept. Interior, 85 Interior Dec. 433, 6 Indian L. Rptr. H-1 (Nov. 14, 1978); F.
COHEN, supra note 43, at 367.
91. 439 U.S. 463, 488 n. 32 (1979).
92. Yakima Nation v. Washington, No. 2732 (E.D. Washington, May 18, 1981).
93. Fawcett v. Fawcett, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 5063 (Sup. Ct. Alaska, 1st Dist. 1986).
But see Native Village of Nenana v. State, 722 P.2d 219, 222 (Alaska 1986) (court
refused to decide general question of concurrency between tribal and state court
jurisdiction).
94. Hepler v. Perkins, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6011, 6015 (Sitka C. Ass'n Tribal Ct. 1986)
(under Pub. L. No. 83-280, state and tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
child welfare matters).
95. See generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (prosecution in
both tribal and federal courts not double jeopardy).
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tion over the reservation, but granted to the states some of the
federal jurisdiction once exercised by the United States concur-
rently with the tribes. As a result, some states obtained
through a combination of federal, state, and tribal action, cer-
tain kinds of criminal and civil jurisdiction on the reserva-
tion.96  This jurisdiction is exercised by the states concurrently
with that of the tribes. The United States did not, however, by
enacting Public Law 83-280, diminish tribal jurisdiction. When
Congress has acted to abolish or remove jurisdiction from the
Indian courts it has done so expressly. 7 In ruling on their own
jurisdiction, therefore, Indian courts on reservations where
Public Law 83-280 has some effect, will generally apply the
rules of law applicable to courts exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.98
The limited jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 83-280
has not stripped the Indian courts of their civil regulatory
jurisdiction over persons and lands within the territory of the
tribe.99 And it has been held that Public Law 83-280 granted
the states no civil regulatory jurisdiction at all. 1°°
96. State jurisdiction under Pub. L. No. 83-280 is limited to those Indians and
lands specifically set out in a state's assertion of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Idaho v. Allan,
100 Idaho 918, 607 P.2d 426, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 4031 (1980), (state court had no
jurisdiction over tribal Indians from other states).
97. Muskogee (Creek) Nation v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 131 Interior Bd. Indian
App. 211, 213-14, 92 Interior Dec. 309, 314 (1985) (United States expressly removed
general civil and criminal jurisdiction of Creek Tribal courts and later Acts of
Congress did not restore that jurisdiction). See also Collins, Limits on Tribal
Jurisdiction, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479, 496 n. 146 (1979).
98. Hepler v. Perkins, 13 Indian L. Rptr. at 6013-15.
99. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 750, 758 (E.D. Wash. 1985)
(jurisdiction of tribe to enforce land use regulations on non-Indian fee lands within the
reservation).
100. Cabazon Band v. County of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 (1987) (Pub. L. No. 83-
280 does not grant states civil regulatory jurisdiction on Indian lands). Accord United
States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing civil, criminal and
regulatory state laws); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245, 249
(D. Conn. 1986) (grant of power to states limited to criminal prohibition). See also
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Area Director, 7 Interior Bd. Indian App. 299, 299-
300, 86 Interior Dec. 680, 682 (1979) (Public Law 83-280, did not grant general civil
regulatory jurisdiction to states); Thomson v. King County, 39 Wash. App. at 508-09,
694 P.2d at 43, 12 Indian L. Rptr. at 5013-14 (state civil jurisdiction limited to private
causes of action and Pub. L. No. 83-280 does not provide the state with any civil
regulatory jurisdiction); State v. Lemieux, 106 Wis. 2d 484, 490, 317 N.W.2d 166, 169, 9
Indian L. Rptr. 5037, 5038-39 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 110 Wis. 2d 158, 327 N.W.2d 669
(1983) (where violations of state statute are not punished criminally, state had no
jurisdiction under Pub. L. No. 83-280 to enforce regulatory statute against Indian).
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E. Exclusionary Jurisdiction
Modern cases recognize the ancient, sovereign power of
tribes to exclude non-members from their reservations.10' The
exclusion action is considered an exercise of civil jurisdic-
tion.0 2 Most tribes have codified this power and have placed
authority to exclude totally within their courts. An exclusion
proceeding usually involves a non-jury hearing at which the
person being expelled is entitled to appear and contest a
charge that he violated one of the grounds set out in the tribal
code. Grounds for exclusion vary to some degree, but they
generally involve removal of non-members from the reserva-
tion who are found to have violated tribal law or to be a dan-
ger to the security of the community.
1 0 3
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE INDIAN COURTS
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act
The civil rights of citizens, both Indian and non-Indian,
touched by actions of tribal governments are most effectively
enforced through proceedings in the Indian courts. Civil rights
suits filed in state and federal courts against tribal govern-
ments and officials will usually be dismissed on two grounds:
first, because Indian tribes enjoy certain immunities from
suit;1° 4 and second, because tribal governments, as separate
sovereigns predating the United States Constitution, are not
subject to the provisions of the federal bill of rights.1"5 Tribal
governments are reluctant to waive sovereign immunity so as
101. See supra note 54. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
138-39 (1982) (power of exclusion is basis for exercise of tribal sovereign authority over
non-Indians within reservation). But see Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D. Ariz.
1969) (exclusion of non-Indian by tribal council constituted unlawful bill of attainder).
102. Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 761 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1985)
(exercise of tribal power to exclude is considered civil matter).
103. Naswood v. Foremost Financial Services, 3 Navajo Rptr. 138, 140 (1982)
(corporation that disobeyed tribal court order may be barred from doing business on
reservation).
104. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977) (Indian tribes
retain common law sovereign immunity from suit). See also Gover & Lawrence,
Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 497 (1985); Johnson &
Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Tribal Courts, XII AM. INDIAN L. REV. 2 (1986); Note,
In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REv. 5 (1982).
105. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (prisoners writ of habeas corpus
denied; fifth amendment does not apply to tribes); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (9th Cir. 1959) (first amendment does not protect peyote
used in religious ceremony from being banned by tribal law).
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to allow suits against the tribe in state or federal courts,
largely because they are poor and are unable to afford the
financial liability that such waivers would entail.'06
Some tribal constitutions contain a specific bill of rights
and some tribes have adopted statutory definitions of civil
rights. 0 7 However, in 1968, to provide for a clear declaration
of civil rights on all reservations, Congress adopted a bill of
rights for the tribes as a part of the Indian Civil Rights Act.108
The federal courts quickly found in the Act broad jurisdic-
tional grounds to resolve inter-tribal disputes. Subsequently,
the United States Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez severely limited the power of the federal courts to
entertain claims under the Act, but held the Act applicable,
through the Indian courts, to the actions of all tribal govern-
ments and their agencies. 09
Indian courts have generally taken the position that under
the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act, they have juris-
diction to construe and enforce provisions of tribal constitu-
tions; 10 and, despite claims of sovereign immunity by tribes
and tribal officials, they have jurisdiction to enforce the Act
where ultra vires actions by tribal agencies or officers are
alleged."' Also, Indian courts have consistently held that the
106. Report of the Task Force On Indian Development, Assistant Secretary for
Policy and Budget Administration, United States Department of the Interior (1986)
Govt. Printing Office O-168-060QL-3. Cf. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450F(1), 450(g) (1976).
107. See NAVAJO TRIBAL CODE tit. 1, §§ 1-1.9 (1967). See also CONSTITUTION & By-
LAWS OF THE PUEBLO OF ZUNI (1970).
108. Cf. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-28 (1986).
109. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (Indian courts are
appropriate forum to vindicate rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act). Accord
White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307, 1312, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 2063, 2065 (10th
Cir. 1984) (substantive rights against Indian tribes created by the Indian Civil Rights
Act to be vindicated through tribal forums which are obliged to apply the statute and
recognize rights).
110. Sekaquaptewa v. Hopi Tribal Election Bd., 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6009, 6010 (Hopi
Tribal Ct. 1986) (tribal constitutional right of adult Hopis to vote in tribal elections
cannot be limited by tribal election ordinance). Accord Thompson v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6005, 6006 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1985) (tribal
court has duty to assume jurisdiction over constitutional questions presented); Means
v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Council, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 6013, 6014 (Olglala Sioux Tribal Ct.
1984) (tribal court has jurisdiction to determine, whether tribal ordinance violates
tribal constitution) Cf. Squaxin Island Tribe v. Thomas, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-60, A-61
(Squaxin Island Tribal Ct. 1980) (tribal law and order code held invalid because the
manner in which it was adopted was inconsistent with tribal constitution).
111. Comm. for Clean Gov't v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council, 11 Indian L.
Rptr. 6043, 6043 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1984) (tribal court has jurisdiction in
suit against individual tribal council members where ultra vires actions are alleged).
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Act provides them with the responsibility and jurisdiction to
deal with alleged violations of the Act 12 and to review actions
of the tribal legislature for compliance.113
B. Civil Rights in the Tribal Courts
In the majority of reported cases, Indian courts have
accepted the view that they are responsible for enforcing the
Indian Civil Rights Act. One Indian court, however, concluded
that it could not enforce the provisions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act unless the tribal legislature had, by statute, specifi-
cally waived tribal sovereign immunity." 4 This holding is
Accord Kiowa Business Comm. v. Ware, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-45, A-47 (Ct. Indian
Offenses Kiowa Tribe 1980) (suit requesting injunctive relief from alleged ultra vires
actions of tribal officials, would not be barred by sovereign immunity). Cf. Holy Rock
v. Tribal Election Bd., 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6009, 6009 (Oglala Sioux Tribal Ct. 1982)
(administrative officials performing their duties according to law are immune from
suit but court may review their actions to determine propriety). Compare Burnette v.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-51, A-51 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct. 1978)
(suit claiming that actions of tribal officials were unlawful, unconstitutional, and ultra
vires would not be barred by sovereign immunity) with Grant v. Greivance Comm. of
the Sac & Fox Tribe, 2 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-39, A-53 (Ct. Indian Offenses Sac & Fox
Tribe 1981) (because tribal grievance committee acted within the authority lawfully
delegated to it by the tribe, suit would be barred by sovereign immunity).
112. Montreal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6004
(Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1985) (although Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to United States Constitution not applicable to tribe, Indian Civil Rights Act requires
due process of law); Le Compte v. Jewett, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6025, 6026 (Cheyenne
River Sioux Ct. App. 1985) (tribal sovereign immunity waived by Indian Civil Rights
Act and tribal constitution provides for judicial review). Accord Miller v. Crow Creek
Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6008, 6012 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1984) (criminal
complaint dismissed because tribe had not complied with defendant's right to speedy
and public trial protected by Indian Civil Rights Act); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. White
Hat, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 6033, 6034 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1983) (failure of tribal court to
maintain adequate record of trial is a violation of criminal defendant's right to appeal,
judgment vacated as violation of Indian Civil Rights Act); Crow Creek Tribe v. Baum,
10 Indian L. Rptr. 6031, 6034 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1983) (judgment of civil contempt
reversed, contempt statute violated defendant's right to due process). Cf. Navajo
Nation v. Franklin, 1 Navajo Rptr. 145, 148 (1977) (failure of tribal police to obtain
search warrant may result in suppression of evidence under Navajo Bill of Rights);
Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Electric Co., 1 Navajo Rptr. 95, 99 (1974) (provisions of
Indian Civil Rights Act prohibit tribe's condemnation of land without due process of
law). See generally Matter of the Colville Confederated Tribal Jail, 13 Indian L. Rptr.
6021, 6021 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1986) (tribal court refused to commit prisoners to tribal
jail on grounds that jail conditions violate prisoner's rights under Indian Civil Rights
Act); Greger v. Greger, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 6025, 6026 (Colo. River Tribal Ct. 1984)
("tender age" doctrine violates equal protection provisions of Indian Civil Rights Act).
113. Chapoose v. Ute Indian Tribe, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 6023, 6024 (Ute Tribal Ct.
1986) (tribal court has responsibility to review actions of tribal council for compliance
with Indian Civil Rights Act).
114. Garmen v. Ft. Belknap Community Council, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 6017, 6017
(Fort Belknap Tribal Ct. 1984) (tribal court lacked jurisdiction because tribal council
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clearly wrong.11 It flies in the face of numerous statements in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, that the Supreme Court
expected tribal forums to enforce the Act because Congress
had changed tribal law by enacting its provisions:
"It appears that the Committee viewed § 1302 as enforceable
only on habeas corpus and in tribal forums."' 1 6 ". . . Con-
gress intended only to modify the substance of the law appli-
cable to Indian tribes .... ,117 "Tribal forums are available
to vindicate rights created by the Act, and § 1302 has the
substantial and intended effect of changing the law which
these forums are obliged to apply.""'
Generally, the Indian courts have accepted the provisions of
the Act as binding on them," 9 and will protect the civil rights
of persons affected by tribal actions under the Indian Civil
Rights Act or tribal law. 2 '
In order to effectively represent an individual plaintiff
with a claim for violation of civil rights against a tribal agency
or official in an Indian court, a non-Indian lawyer must learn
about the tribal culture, customs, and law that are the basis of
the tribal concept of civil rights. This is especially important
when the client is an Indian. The Indian client usually wants
did not expressly waive sovereign immunity to allow suit under Indian Civil Rights
Act).
115. Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 204, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-70, A-71
(1978) (judicial review of Council by tribal courts mandated by Indian Civil Rights
Act). Cf. Nez v. Bradley, 3 Navajo Rptr. 126, 130 (1982) (district courts of Navajo
Nation have power to enforce Indian Civil Rights Act).
116. 436 U.S. 49, 70 n.28 (1978).
117. Id. at 70 n.27.
118. Id. at 65. See also Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978)
(tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try non-Indians).
119. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Mills, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6047, 6048 (Ute. Ct. App.
1981) (restitution requirement in sentence did not violate limitations on punishment
set out in the Indian Civil Rights Act). Cf. United States v. McGahuey, 10 Indian L.
Rptr. 6051, 6052 (Hoopa Ct. Indian Offenses 1983) (Indian Civil Rights Act protects
right to jury trial in criminal tribal proceedings).
120. In re L.L.H., 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6043, 6044 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1982) (failure
of tribal court to decide dependence or neglect of child and failure to issue written
opinion violates due process and equal protection under tribal law). Accord Heredia v.
Heredia, 4 Navajo. Rptr. 124, 128 (1983) (due process clause of Indian Civil Rights Act
and Navajo Bill of Rights guarantees the right of all debtors to hearing). See also
Keeswood v. Navajo Tribe and Navajo Division of Public Safety, 1 Navajo Rptr. 362,
368 (D. Shiprock 1978) (Navajo tradition of free speech and provisions of the Indian
Civil Rights Act prevent tribal court enforcement of vague and unpublished statute
restricting assembly); Navajo Nation v. Lee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 185, 186 (D. Window Rock
1983) (Indian Civil Rights Act and Navajo Bill of Rights require criminal complaint to
be clear and certain).
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to remain an effective and respected part of reservation soci-
ety, whether his lawsuit is won or lost, and this result may be
compromised if the goal of the lawsuit is not somewhat consis-
tent with the tribal understanding of personal rights.
Just as American concepts of fairness and civil rights are a
product of a unique history and culture, so too are American
Indian concepts derived from a unique history and culture.
The differences between the two cultures sometimes result in
variances in the answers given to the same question. The
Indian civil rights advocate cannot assume that an argument
neatly reasoned from the federal cases will prevail in an Indian
court, or more importantly, that winning a judgment based on
concepts of civil rights not accepted by the Indian community
will solve the problems of a client or a community. 121  A stiff
money judgment or injunction may not resolve the issue where
the tribal culture puts little value in either. Simply put, Indian
judges and juries respond more readily to concepts and solu-
tions that they can agree will work to solve a problem within
the reservation society.
Although the federal courts have construed some of the
provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act to be substantially
similar in content to protection afforded by the Constitution, 122
those same courts have consistently maintained that the spe-
cial culture, history and sovereignty of tribal Indians and their
governments play roles in interpreting the Act.1 23  This dichot-
omy in the cases suggests the tension between an assumption
121. See, e.g., Othole v. Wesley and the Zuni Tribal Police Department, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW No. 5 at 492 (Zuni Tribal Ct. June 6, 1980) (Teenaged girl,
wearing pajamas when arrested, was incarcerated overnight in a padded cell with an
intoxicated adult male prisoner. Charges against her were dismissed. A small money
judgment was obtained, the officer responsible was required to publish a public
apology, and the tribal police agreed to undergo training in arrest, search, seizure, and
civil rights).
122. United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1981) (search and seizure
issue considered under fifth amendment standards); United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d
1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1981) (fifth amendment protections govern arrests by Indian
officials on reservation).
123. Necklace v. Tribal Court, 554 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1977) (Indian not
required to exhaust tribal remedies before habeus corpus action). See also Tom v.
Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1976) (tribal courts not required to appoint
counsel in criminal actions); Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1083
(8th Cir. 1975) (twenty-sixth amendment not applicable to tribal elections); Yellow
Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440-41 (D.S.D. 1974) (membership
provisions of tribal constitution not subject to fourteenth amendment equal
protection); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 633 (D. Utah 1973) (plaintiffs sought
official recognition as governing business council of tribes).
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that the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution is good
for all societies and, where possible, should be imposed; and
the concept of Indian self-determination. Indian self-determi-
nation, as articulated by Congress in the Indian Self-determi-
nation Act,124 by the executive branch in President Ronald
Reagan's policy statement on Indian affairs,'125 and by the
United States Supreme Court 126 forms the basic foundation for
the continued existence of culturally separate, cohesive, Indian
societies in the United States.
The unreflective, total imposition of federal Bill of Rights
standards on Indian societies by the federal courts created
numerous problems for the Indian courts. Some federal
judges, for example, decided that because Indian tribes had
adopted election methods that appeared similar to those uti-
lized by states, concepts of electoral fairness imposed by the
Supreme Court on the states127 should apply to tribal elec-
tions. 28 It is true that many tribes have integrated elections,
secret ballots, and voter registration into their schemes for
selecting representative leadership. These concepts are, how-
ever, often blended into an Indian way of government that is
designed to meet unique needs about which non- Indian polit-
ical societies are not concerned.1 29
124. 25 USC § 450 (1975).
125. "This administration intends to restore tribal governments to their rightful
place among the governments of this nation and to enable tribal governments ... to
resume control over their own affairs.", President Ronald Reagan, Presidential
Statement on Indian Policy, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 98, 99 (January 24, 1983).
126. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (tribal Indians have the right to
make their own laws and be ruled by them).
127. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (state statute which effected an
apportionment deprived plaintiff of equal protection and was unjustifiable).
128. See Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 841 (8th Cir. 1975) (civil rights complaint
arising from election dispute); See also Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d
233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusal by tribe to declare plaintiffs as eligible candidates
because of residency requirements was not violation of rights); Daly v. United States,
483 F.2d 700, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1973) (class action suit claimed tribal council was
malapportioned thus denying equal protection); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d
1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973) (action to enjoin election and require reapportionment).
129. Yazzie v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, 1 Navajo Rptr. 213, 217
(1978);
"The reapportionment plan adopted by the council may have satisfied
minimum federal requirements but in no way did it satisfy the unique
requirements of the Navajo electorate.
Any plan adopted for the Navajo Nation must take into account chapter
boundaries, agency boundaries, district grazing boundaries and other
geographic symbols of the traditional clan relationship of the Navajo people.
To do otherwise is to impose alien concepts on the Navajo people in total
disregard of their proud, historic and unique character." Id
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For example, many Indian "nations" and "confederated"
tribal groups consist of several, once independent, sovereign
tribes and bands with different histories, customs, religions,
territories, and languages. Historically required by military
force or federal demands to reside together on one reservation
under a single constitution or tribal organization, 30 the gov-
ernments of such Indian tribes are more readily compared to a
confederation or union of separate states under a federal con-
stitution, than to the citizens of a city under a charter or a
state under a constitution.
The individual tribes and bands located on one reservation
may have settled, and continued to inhabit specific sections of
the reservation. They may also keep some separate customs
and traditions. Block voting during tribal elections to maintain
representation of bands, clans, or religious societies on the tri-
bal council is common. Many such amalgamated tribal govern-
ments try to preserve band and clan identity by permitting
registration of members in any electoral district regardless of
domicile, providing for voting by tribal members living in cer-
tain districts outside the reservation, or allowing voting by
members wherever they live; in all of these, membership, not
domicile, is the criterion for voting. 3 ' The imposition of
American concepts of voting rights may hinder the realization
of specific and legitimate goals of Indian societies.
Suits brought to attack the electoral and other governmen-
tal processes of the tribes posed a quandary for Indian courts
Cf. Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 211, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-70, A-80 (1978)
("The final issue is whether the expenditure [of tribal funds] was for a public or pri-
vate purpose... we cannot adequately explain our ruling on this point in English...
we have chosen to announce this part of our decision from the bench in Navajo.").
130. See C. TRAF-ZER, INDIANS, SUPERINTENDENTS AND COUNCILS, NORTHWESTERN
INDIAN POLICY 1850-1855 (1986).
131. The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Washington, consisting
of numerous separate bands and tribes, is a good example of this situation. All adult
Colvilles, wherever they reside, may vote in tribal elections. Residence on the
reservation is not required. Adult members may register to vote in any tribal district
and are not limited to the district of domicile. This permits band and family
allegiances to remain intact by allowing members to vote in the district where their
tribe or band resides notwithstanding their actual residence. COLVILLE TRIBAL
ELECTION ORDINANCE §§ 5.2, 5.3 (1980). Accord Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr.
at 195, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. at A-74 ("By custom, Navajos are allowed to register and vote
in the area where they are from, rather than where they live."). See also Solicitor's
Opinion M-36141, II Op. Solicitor Dept. Interior 1582 (1952) (a large minority of tribes
do not require voters to reside on reservations). Cf. CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF
THE QUINAULT INDIAN NATION (1975) (provides for voting by members residing in
designated districts outside the reservation).
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in the era when the federal courts exercised broad jurisdiction
over reservation affairs through the provisions of the Indian
Civil Rights Act." 2 The normal struggle for political advan-
tage that exists in all societies became confused on the reserva-
tion because sudden federal court intervention appeared to
place the government of the reservation in the federal court-
house rather than the tribal council chamber.'33 Tribal law,
custom, and tradition, which had governed in the past, now
confronted the apparently stronger non- Indian concepts of
electoral process and civil rights. The Indian courts had to
contend with the foreign concepts in which the federal Bill of
Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act are rooted. Tribal
judges were forced to make an unacceptable choice. If they
chose the Indian way, their decisions were denigrated and
reversed by the federal courts.' If they chose to strictly
apply federal law, they were knowingly destroying their own
culture and tradition.
It is not surprising that the Indian courts before Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez had little to say about the Indian
Civil Rights Act. In some instances, the federal courts denied
Indian judges the opportunity to construe the Act.135 When,
however, the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo decided
that the interpretation and implementation of the Act was to
be left to Indian judges, most Indian courts acted appropri-
ately-interpreting the Act to harmonize its provisions with
tribal custom and tradition. 36
132. See id.
133. One federal district court virtually took over the tribal election process,
deciding which tribal traditions comported with the court's interpretation of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. See Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973); Johnson
& Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).
134. See, e.g., Takes Gun v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 448 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mont.
1978) (Federal district court refused to allow the Crow Court of Indian Offenses to
interpret its own jurisdictional statute and took opportunity to criticize Blackfeet
Tribal Court for completely unrelated decision).
135. See, e.g., Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d at 240 (Federal court
relied in part on an offhand, out of court telephone conversation between a tribal
judge and an attorney for a party to determine that the tribal court could offer no
remedy to a plaintiff suing under the Indian Civil Rights Act. On the strength of the
tribal judge's statement, the court refused to allow formal presentation of the issues to
the tribal court).
136. See, e.g., Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Board of Election Supervisors, 1 Navajo
Rptr. at 215 ("Judicial review of Council actions is, in our view, mandated by 25 U.S.C.
1302(8) as well as by Navajo tradition and custom."). See also supra notes 110-113, 120,
129.
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C Juries and the Right to Representation
Tribal courts are required under the Indian Civil Rights
Act to provide juries in criminal trials and inform defendants
of their rights to a jury trial. 37 On the other hand, decisions
regarding the right to jury trial in civil matters are left to the
tribes and the civil procedure section of the tribal code should
be consulted. The majority of Indian courts permit juries in
most civil cases and code provisions establishing six-person
juries are standard. Juries are likely to be chosen from the tri-
bal membership roll, but a large and growing number of Indian
courts draw juries from the residents of the reservation,
thereby including non-Indian jurors on the panel.13  The prac-
tice of striking juries without voir dire by counsel, common in
the past, has given way to full voir dire, peremptory chal-
lenges, and challenges for cause.
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Indian court must
allow parties and defendants to have counsel of their choice, so
long as the counsel selected is a member of the tribal bar.
39
Many tribes provide free or low-fee public defender advocates
in criminal cases through federally and tribally funded legal
aid programs. Tribes are not, however, required to supply
counsel to indigent defendants. 4 °
D. Independence of Indian Courts
General doctrines of American law applicable to judges
are regularly applied to Indian judges.' 4 ' For instance, Indian
judges enjoy judicial immunities similar to other judges in the
United States.'42 The Indian judiciary does not always, how-
137. See, e.g., Red Elk v. Silk, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 3109, 3110 (1983) (tribal court
must inform criminal defendants of right to jury trial). Accord 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10)
(1968).
138. Compare QUINALT TRIBAL CODE § 30.11(b) (1973) ("a jury shall consist of six
persons and one alternate... from a list of residents of the Quinalt Reservation .. ")
with COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE § 1.7.01 (1980) ("Any person who is at least 18 years of
age and who has resided on the reservation for at least a year shall be eligible to be a
juror.").
139. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1147 (8th Cir. 1973)
("relatively high" license fee imposed by tribe for admission to tribal court bar did not
deny counsel to Indian plaintiffs in violation of Indian Civil Rights Act).
140. See, e.g., Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1976) (Constitution of
Lummi tribe did not intend to provide defense counsel at tribe expense).
141. See, e.g., Ramos v. Pyramid Lake Tribal Ct., 626 F. Supp. 1582, 1584 (D. Nev.
1986) (doctrine of "de facto judge" applied to tribal court).
142. Brunette v. Dann, 417 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Idaho 1976) (Indian judges
enjoy judicial immunity). Accord Curtis v. Navajo Nation Bar Assn., 3 Navajo Rptr.
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ever, enjoy constitutional independence from other branches of
tribal government. The concept of judicial review, while
accepted by the Indian courts as within their powers, 143 can
cause the same kinds of inter-branch struggle experienced by
the government of the United States in its early years.
Some tribal constitutions, like that of the Quinault Indian
Nation, 4 4 provide for an independent tribal court and formal
impeachment as the only remedy for removal of a judge. The
organic documents of other tribes are much less clear. Inter-
ference in court proceedings by the tribal executive and legis-
lative branches is not unknown. Despite the pressures, Indian
courts, in terms of the longevity in office of those occupying
the tribal bench, 4 are quite stable. Recently, the courts of the
Navajo Nation were impeded in their work by a tribal execu-
tive branch unhappy with several of their decisions. That
unfortunate period is now over and a strong tribal bench seems
to be firmly established. 46
In most respects, the advocate should follow the lead of
the federal executive and judicial branches and deal with tribal
judicial systems as separate and independent branches of tribal
government. Supporting this policy are federal court decisions
that require exhaustion of Indian court remedies prior to
accepting federal jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights
Act. The National American Indian Court Judges Association
has recently devoted several of its training sessions to discus-
sions of the separation of powers between legislative and judi-
178, 179 (D. Window Rock 1982) (officers of the Navajo courts are immune from suit
for conduct arising from their official duties).
143. See Halona v. MacDonald, 1 Navajo Rptr. 189, 204, 1 Tribal Ct. Rptr. A-70, A-
77 (1978) (Navajo law and custom and federal law mandate judicial review of tribal
council actions); see also Yazzie v. Navajo Tribal Board of Election Supervisors, 1
Navajo Rptr. 213, 215 (1978) (judicial review of council action mandated by federal
law).
144. QUINAULT INDIAN NATION CONST., art. V, § 3b See also SISSETON-WHAPETON
Sioux TRIBE REVISED CONST., art. III, § 5.
145. Olney & Getches, Indian Courts and the Future, 41 (U.S. Govt. Printing
Office, 1978).
146. Ziontz, After Martinez, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 18 (1979) (Navajo judges now
receive appointments for life after serving a probationary term of two years or more
and receiving a recommendation of permanent appointment from the Judiciary
Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council; the recommendation is given only after a
comprehensive, public evaluation based on objective standards); see, e.g., NAVAJO TRIB.
CODE tit. 2, § 572 (1982); NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 7, §§ 251, 301 (1982). But see Runs
After v. United States, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 2124 (8th Cir. 1985) (members of Cheyenne
River Sioux tribe challenged validity of tribal council resolutions which "forever
barred" appellants from holding elected or appointed office).
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cial branches, and the Indian courts have started to develop a
body of written law on the issue.'47 In the great majority of
tribal courts, interference by other branches of tribal govern-
ment is a constitutional worry rather than a practical problem.
VI. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
A. Exhaustion of Remedies in Indian Courts
The major intention of the drafters of the Indian Civil
Rights Act,'48 was to provide protection for the Indian defend-
ant in criminal prosecutions before the Indian courts. 149 Yet in
the ten years between the adoption of the Indian Civil Rights
Act and the limitation placed on federal court jurisdiction in
Santa Clara Pueblo, the overwhelming majority of cases based
on the Act dealt with civil, intra-tribal disputes of one sort or
another. Plaintiffs with complaints about tribal elections,
enrollment, and property rights rushed to the federal courts.150
Indian courts, perceived by all parties as less powerful than
federal institutions, and assumed by the federal courts to be
ineffective,' 5 1 were not expected to decide the major questions
of Indian government. Despite this presumption of ineffetive-
ness, the federal bench developed the doctrine of "exhaustion
of tribal remedies" during this period. Established as a condi-
tion precedent to obtaining jurisdiction over a proceeding
brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act, exhaustion of tribal
remedies did not account for the abilities of tribal institutions
to resolve disputes in the Indian context. 5 2
The "exhaustion doctrine" began as an attempt to include
tribal institutions 5 3 in the process of adjudicating disputes
147. See, e.g., Le Compte v. Jewett, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6025, 6026 (Cheyenne River
Sioux Ct. App. 1985) ("as a matter of tribal law, we find that the Indian people of the
Cheyenne River Indian Reservation intended that the people should have a right to a
tribal judicial forum to judicially review actions of the tribal council.").
148. 25 USC §§ 1301-1341 (1976).
149. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 n.1 (1978).
150. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Driving Hawk, 534 F.2d 98, 101 (8th Cir.
1976) (federal district court lawfully ignored tribal procedures for resolving election
disputes and both parties sought relief in federal court, foregoing tribal remedies).
151. Olney Runs After v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 437 F. Supp. 1035, 1037
(D.S.D. 1977) (district court allowed Indian Civil Rights Act plaintiffs to ignore
appellate procedure in tribal court and proceed with action in federal court).
152. St. Marks v. Chippewa Creek Tribe, 545 F.2d 1188, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff dissatisfied with tribal court ruling, and federal forum made available).
153. Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (exhaustion of tribal
remedies required prior to assertion of federal jurisdiction over Indian Civil Rights Act
claims).
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under the Indian Civil Rights Act. But it soon evolved into a
paternalistic nod by the federal courts in the direction of
Indian customs and traditions prior to making the decision for
the tribe.' Issues that the Santa Clara Pueblo Court later
said were better left to "tribal forums",155 were sometimes
handled in a rather insensitive fashion by federal judges.'56
The decision in Santa Clara Pueblo significantly reduced
the role of the federal courts in reviewing tribal decisions, and
for a time, little was heard of the exhaustion doctrine. Most
federal courts simply threw out civil actions arising on the res-
ervation.17 The doctrine has survived, however, in two con-
texts. First, federal courts apply it whenever a writ of habeas
corpus is sought that results from the detention of a person by
an Indian court.58 In this context, the federal courts continue
to be unable to resist the temptation to make only a slight bow
toward the exhaustion doctrine before going to the merits of
the problem. 59
Second, after the decision in National Farmers Union
Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the exhaustion
of tribal remedies doctrine has reappeared in the civil context.
Federal courts, directed by the Supreme Court to defer to
Indian court decisions regarding tribal jurisdiction in civil
154. Takes Gun v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 448 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (D. Mont. 1978)
(federal court ruled that tribal court lacked jurisdiction); see also Howlett v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 240 (9th Cir. 1976) (federal court ruled that out of court
statements made by tribal judge rendered tribal remedies futile); United States ex rel
Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 794 (9th Cir. 1974) (tribal court lacked jurisdiction once
federal habeas corpus relief was requested).
155. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 71.
156. See supra notes 128, 133-135, 150-154. See also intfra note 161.
157. See, e.g., Boe v. Ft. Belknap Indian Community, 642 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir.
1981) (federal courts retain right, pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, to review by
habeas corpus tribal orders that require detention of persons).
158. Necklace v. Tribal Court, 554 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1977) (unless tribal
remedies contain no formal habeas corpus procedure, litigants must exhaust tribal
remedies before seeking federal jurisdiction).
159. Ramos v. Pyramid Lake Tribal Court, 621 F. Supp. 967, 969-70 (D. Nev. 1985)
(defendant failed to timely pay the filing fee for appeal to tribal court, so an attempt to
exhaust his tribal remedies would be futile). But see Smith v. Confederated Tribes of
the Warm Springs Reservation, 783 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986) (federal courts will
generally defer to tribal court in habeas corpus proceeding); Brunette v. Dann, 417 F.
Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Idaho 1976); (a deliberate bypass of tribal remedies does not
provide a basis to claim that tribal remedies are futile or exhausted). The fact that the
Ramos Court found that the petitioner had exhausted his tribal remedies, when he
had simply ignored them, can be attributed to the oft remarked tendency of the
federal courts in habeas corpus actions to move to the merits prior to considering a
difficult jurisdictional question. See 16 Fed. Proc. L. Ed., § 41:258 (1983).
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cases, have styled their responses as an "exhaustion" require-
ment.160  The role of the federal courts under the rule in
National Farmers Union, is, however, much more limited than
that which prevailed prior to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
Before 1978, a federal court merely looked to see whether
the parties had used, or tried to use, what the federal court
believed to be available tribal remedies to settle the matter. If
the court believed that all reasonable tribal remedies were
exhausted, or that pursuing further tribal remedies was futile,
it construed Indian Civil Rights Act jurisdiction broadly and
took charge of the issue. Some federal courts developed a view
which equated the exhaustion requirement with settlement
negotiations.'6 '
National Farmers Union, does not, however reinstate the
pre-Santa Clara Pueblo exhaustion analysis. Rather, National
Farmers Union, permits the federal court to decide whether,
under certain circumstances, and as a matter of federal law,
the tribal court may exercise jurisdiction over a specific person
or subject matter. The federal court may make this decision
only after the Indian court, including any tribal appellate
forum, has decided whether or not it has jurisdiction. 62 Only
then may the federal court decide whether, under federal
law," 3 the Indian court has properly ruled on its own
160. See A & A Concrete v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411, 1416-17
(9th Cir. 1986) (non-Indian plaintiff required to exhaust tribal remedies in claim
against tribe, subsidiary, and other defendants); Superior Oil v. United States, 798 F.2d
1324, 1329 (10th Cir., 1986) (plaintiff seeking declaratory and injuctive relief against
tribe for refusal to approve oil and gas lease assignments must exhaust tribal
remedies); Williams v. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, 625 F. Supp. 1457, 1458-59 (D. Nev.
1986) (wrongful death action for death on reservation requires exhaustion of tribal
remedies).
161. See, e.g., St. Marks v. Chippewa Cree Tribe, 545 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1976)
(tribal court ruling on the merits found not binding on federal court).
162. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987) (at a minimum,
exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the
opportunity to review lower tribal court determinations).
163. Federal courts should, in general, allow tribal courts to interpret tribal law.
See A & A Concrete v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d at 1416-17 (civil action
involving an Indian and a non-Indian); Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 352-
53 (8th Cir. 1985) (dispute involving questions of interpreting tribal constitution and
tribal law was not within jurisdiction of district court); Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d
335, 338 (8th Cir. 1983) (district court overstepped the boundaries of its jurisdiction in
interpreting a tribal constitution, bylaws, and election dispute); R.J. Williams v. Fort
Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 1983) (tribal court must
determine whether contractual dispute is in tribal court's jurisdiction). Accord Benally
v. John, 4 Navajo Rptr. 39, 40-41 (1983) (Navajo Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
decide its jurisdiction over validity of deed in probate proceeding); Estate of Reed
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jurisdiction.
If the federal court decides as a matter of federal law that
the Indian court is without jurisdiction, it may vacate or enjoin
the decision of the Indian court. It does not follow, however,
from such a decision that the federal court itself obtains juris-
diction over the substance of the case tried in the Indian
court."6 It is conceivable that a federal court could simultane-
ously find the Indian court's assertion of jurisdiction unlawful
and that sufficient federal jurisdiction to proceed to the merits
of the dispute is lacking. Whether such a procedure should be
designated "exhaustion of tribal remedies" is a matter of
semantics. As a practical matter, National Farmers Union
provides federal courts with the power to review an Indian
court's assertion of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court did not
increase a federal court's power to resolve the substance of a
dispute in Indian country.
The doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies as it was
understood by the federal courts prior to National Farmers
Union remains alive in an opinion by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, Dry Creek Lodge v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes. e5
While the Tenth Circuit may now be backing away from its
analysis in Dry Creek, 6 ' the opinion has not been overruled.
Reliance on Dry Creek in an attempt to bring Indian Civil
Rights Act claims into federal courts may be, however, unpro-
ductive. No court in any circuit has followed the holding in
Dry Creek to the extent that federal jurisdiction under the
Indian Civil Rights Act has been found. The Ninth Circuit has
rejected its reasoning.'
Descheeny, 4 Navajo Rptr. 145, 145 (D. Window Rock 1983) (tribal court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether statute of limitations has been waived in probate
proceeding). See also Marriage of Limpy, - Mont. -, -, 636 P.2d 266, 270 (1981) (in
dissolution and custody proceeding, exclusive tribal court jurisdiction recognized as
matter of comity); Gambles Home Center, Inc. v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,
10 Indian L. Rptr. 3097, 3098 (D. Minn. 1983) (until tribal process exhausted, federal
question lacks ripeness); Ike v. Dept. of the Interior, 9 Indian L. Rptr. 3043, 3044 (D.
Nev. 1983) (denying injunction pending outcome of intertribal dispute).
164. See, e.g., Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Assn. v. Smith, 784 F.2d
323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Northwest South
Dakota leaves both the federal state courts without jurisdiction. If the tribal court
found that it too lacked jurisdiction, no forum would be available).
165. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980).
166. Ramey Construction v. Apache Tribe, 673 F.2d 315, 319 n.4 (10th Cir. 1982)
(distinguishing Dry Creek as to the degree of personal restraint and egregious
deprivation of personal rights).
167. Williams v. Pyramid Lake Paute Tribe, 625 F. Supp. 1457, 1458 (D. Nev.
1986).
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The Tenth Circuit has described Dry Creek as an excep-
tion to the rule in Santa Clara Pueblo. 6 This exception
requires a plaintiff seeking federal jurisdiction under the
Indian Civil Rights Act to meet the following test. First, the
plaintiff must thoroughly exhaust all possible avenues of reso-
lution within the tribal government. Second, the plaintiff must
show that an absolute necessity exists for the assertion of fed-
eral jurisdiction and that a great injustice would be done if the
federal court does not accept jurisdiction.169 To further con-
fuse the situation, the Tenth Circuit has exempted whole
classes of cases from the Dry Creek "exception".17°
B. Appeal and Review
Most tribal codes allow for appeals on the record. Some
codes allow for a trial de novo under certain circumstances on
granting of an appeal. 7' Upon approaching a hearing or trial
in an Indian court, a thorough knowledge of the manner in
which the court makes its record of the case (usually by tape
recording) and the appellate rules is crucial. Time deadlines
for filing appeals tend to be short. Under some tribal codes,
parties must convince an appellate judge that an appeal is mer-
ited before the appeal will be accepted and docketed for hear-
ing. Appellate panels, usually consisting of three judges, are
commonly drawn from local tribal judges who did not hear the
case, tribal judges from other reservations, and state or munici-
pal trial court judges.
Extensive appellate rules have not been enacted by most
tribes. Appellants dealing with a code in which appellate rules
are sparse may obtain a more rapid disposition of their appeal
by drafting and presenting, for consideration by the court, a
proposed order listing time limitations, briefing limitations and
168. White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir., 1984) (civil action
against Indian tribe by non-Indians).
169. See, e.g., Sahmaunt v. Horse, 593 F. Supp. 162, 165 (W.D. Ok. 1984) (federal
jurisdiction absent where dispute was intratribal and there was no showing that tribal
remedies were unavailable).
170. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1981); (constitutional
challenge so lacked substance that no legitimate federal question raised). Accord
Learned v. Cheyenne Arapahoe Tribe, 11 Indian L. Rptr. 3104 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
(election dispute not within subject matter jurisdiction of federal court).
171. See, e.g., QUINAULT TRIBAL CODE, § 30.26 (1973). Accord Mann v. Navajo
Tribe, 4 Navajo Rptr. 83, 84 (1983) (trial de novo in negligence action before full
Navajo Court of Appeals); Kaytso v. Navajo Nation, 3 Navajo Rptr. 1, 2 (1980) (the
only way the Navajo Court of Appeals may consider a fact issue on appeal is by trial de
novo).
[Vol. 10:231
1987] Modern Practice In Indian Courts
schedules, and rules regarding submission of the record. This
can be done even though the appellate rules do not require
such an order. After review and response by all parties, the
appellate court will enter the order as its rules on appeal for
that particular case.
Attorneys unfamiliar with Indian law always want to
know whether a further appeal is available after an Indian
Court of Appeals has issued a decision in a case. Neither fed-
eral nor state authorities have jurisdiction to hear appeals from
the Indian courts." 2 A tribal court is not an inferior court in
the federal judicial system,173 and state courts may not directly
review tribal decisions. 74 A person detained pursuant to an
Indian court order can seek a federal writ of habeas corpus
under the Indian Civil Rights Act 75 but federal courts will
require the prisoner to first exhaust tribal remedies. 76 Thus, a
criminal defendant should appeal or seek a writ in the tribal
system before filing in federal court. Many codes contain
habeas corpus or all writs provisions which give the tribal
172. Committee to Save Our Constitution v. United States, 11 Indian L. Rptr.
3035, 3035 (D.S.D. 1984) (Bureau of Indian Affairs has no authority to review tribal
court decisions for jurisdiction or correctness). See also infra notes 173, 174. Thus, a
federal court should not have the power to remove a case from a tribal court under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443 (1976) because removal power is extended only to state courts and
is narrowly construed. See generally People of the Territory of Guam v. Landgraf, 594
F.2d 201 (9th Cir. 1979) (interpretation of "state" does not include Territory of Guam
absent specific Congressional expression); 29 Fed. Proc. L. Ed. § 69.1 (1983).
173. Washburn v. Parker, 7 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1934) (federal courts lack
jurisdiction over tribal matters unless specifically empowered by law or treaty).
Accord United States v. Walking Crow, 60 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1977) (tribal courts
are not the creation of federal constitution or statute); see generally State ex rel
Flammond v. Flammond, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 471 (1980) (there is no appeal from a
tribal court to the federal court system).
174. See, e.g., White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 550-51, (D.S.D. 1977), qff'd, 581
F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978) (a state court has no jurisdiction to grant de novo review to
tribal court proceedings nor may a tribal court independently transfer a matter over
which it has exclusive jurisdiction).
175. 25 USC § 1303 (1976). See Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 487-88
(9th Cir. 1969) (defendant, who was convicted by a tribal court for violation of tribal
fishing regulations, was granted habeas corpus review by federal court). See also
Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1965) (federal court has jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus to determine the validity of detention of an Indian
committed by a tribal court).
176. Ramos v. Pyramid Lake Tribal Court, 621 F. Supp. 967, 969-70 (D. Nev. 1985).
See also Necklace v. Tribal Court of Three Affiliated Tribes, 554 F.2d 845 (8th Cir.
1977). See generally Ides v. Martin, No. C85-114R, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 3015 (W.D. Wash.,
February 25, 1985); Springer v. Woods, No. 83-306D, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 3106 (D.S.D.
September 24, 1984).
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court the power to grant such a writ.'77
It is unclear at this time whether federal petitions for a
writ by tribal prisoners will be treated by the federal courts in
the same way that habeas petitions from state prisoners are
treated. A federal court reviewing the merits of a petition
from a state prisoner utilizes the federal constitution as a stan-
dard. In reviewing a tribal proceeding, the court's inquiry is
limited to the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the
intentions of Congress in adopting the Act, and the specific his-
tory and culture of the tribe whose actions are being
reviewed.178  The difference in the origins of the standards
applicable to review of a petition is an insufficient reason to
cause the federal courts to use a standard for review of tribal
court proceedings that places a higher burden upon them than
that borne by the state courts in similar proceedings. Nothing
in the Indian Civil Rights Act gives any indication that the tri-
bal courts were to be held to a higher standard than the courts
of the states. v9
If it is believed that the Indian court has acted beyond the
scope of the tribe's jurisdiction, federal courts may review the
acts of Indian judges to determine the limits of their jurisdic-
tion. 80 However, failure to raise an issue which could have
been raised in the tribal court proceeding precludes a party
from raising it in a subsequent or collateral federal action.' 8 ' If
the tribal court has jurisdiction, questions involving the merits
are left to the tribal system and review elsewhere is generally
thought to be unavailable. 8 2 There is no recorded instance of
a writ of certiorari being brought to the Supreme Court from a
177. Waters v. Dick, No. C-86-135-RJM, 13 Indian L. Rptr. 3088 (E.D. Wash. May
10, 1986). Accord COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE § 2.7 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). See
generally Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1947).
178. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976).
179. See generally Weatherwax ex rel Carlson v. Fairbanks, 619 F. Supp. 294 (D.
Mont. 1985) (federal courts have traditionally refused to utilize habeas corpus relief in
child custody matters).
180. National Farmers Union Insurance Co., v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 847 (1985); Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). See also
Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1983) (tribal court
enforcement of tribal taxes levied against non-Indians). See generally Wisconsin v.
Baker, 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) (tribal court enforcement of fishing, hunting, and
trapping regulations against non-Indians); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.
1982) (tribal court enforcement of health regulations against non-Indian businesses
located within reservation).
181. A & A Concrete v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th
Cir. 1986).
182. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
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tribal appellate decision. It is, therefore, unknown how such a
writ would be treated.
C. Enforcement of Judgments and Orders
of the Indian Courts
The orders and judgments of Indian courts acting with
jurisdiction will generally be honored in state and federal
courts.'83 The granting of full faith and credit or comity by an
Indian court to another Indian court or a state court order is
done regularly, 8 ' although that the Indian courts are not
required by law to do so.'
State courts are usually unfamiliar with Indian court
orders, but most states whose appellate courts have considered
the issue have found that a tribal court order or judgment,
entered with proper jurisdiction, is enforceable in a state pro-
ceeding. 8 ' Federal courts have also concluded that tribal court
183. Laurence, Service of Process and Execution of Judgments in Indian Country,
X AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 257 (1982).
184. Ben v. Ben, 4 Navajo Rptr. 74, 75 (1983) (Navajo court recognize foreign
judgments and will enforce them under principles of comity). Accord Anderson
Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Chucksa Energy & Petroleum Co., 4 Navajo Rptr. 187 (D.
Window Rock 1983) (Navajo courts will enforce state court orders and judgments
under principles of comity rather than the full faith and credit clause of the U.S.
Constitution). Cf. Matter of the Custody of B.N.P, B.P., L.P., Jr., Minor Children, 4
Navajo Rptr. 155, 156 (D. Window Rock 1983) (Navajo courts will recognize and
enforce judgments and decrees of other Indian courts "where (1) the other Indian
court has jurisdiction, (2) the proceedings there were proper and (3) it is within the
public policy of the Navajo Nation..
185. Id
186. As to the enforceability of Indian Court judgments in state courts, compare
Jim v. C.I.T. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (tribal laws entitled to full faith
and credit); In re Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906, (Ct. App. 1976) (Navajo customary
law granted full faith and credit in state courts); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d
1334 (1976) (tribal court orders entitled to full faith and credit) with Leon v.
Numnkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 689 P.2d 566 (App. 1984) (Indian court judgments would be
recognized under principle of comity); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895
(1982) (tribal judgments entitled to full faith and credit); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe,
- Mont. -, 654 P.2d 512 (1982) (judgment of Indian courts entitled to comity, with
same deference as foreign judgments); Marriage of Limpy, - Mont. -, 636 P.2d 266
(1981) (exclusive tribal court juriscition recognized as matter of comity); State ex rel
Stewart v. Dist. Ct., 187 Mont. 209, 609 P.2d 290 (1980) (tribal domestic relations code
provides exclusive jurisdiction to tribal courts, Montana courts defer under primciple
of comity); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 1985) (tribal court orders
recognized under principle of comity) and with In re Lynch's Estate, 92 Ariz. 354, 377
P.2d 199 (1962) (proceedings before an Indian court are to be treated as a proceeding of
foreign state); Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950) (enforcing tribal court
judgment although full faith and credit or comity inapplicable); Wakefield v.
Littlelight, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975) (recognizing tribal court actions as
binding); Barrick v. Johnson, 7 Indian L. Rptr. 4001 (S.D. 1979) (where tribal court has
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orders are entitled to comity or full faith credit.1 7
In the controversial area of child welfare, where the rec-
ord indicates that some state courts were unwilling to enforce
Indian court judgments regarding children, Congress has man-
dated full faith and credit. 18 8  The Navajo courts have con-
cluded that the Bureau of Indian Affairs is required to enforce
a tribal court order issued when the order interfered with no
federal rights and upheld federal policy. 1 9 In practice, the
standard applied by most state and federal courts to the
enforcement of Indian court judgments appears similar to the
standard applied to the judgments of a foreign state court,
whether the reviewing court labels its procedure as granting
full faith and credit, or comity.
D. Insurance
Insurance companies have generally struggled to stay out
of the Indian courts, 9 ' probably because of unwarranted fears
of the unknown. However, once tribal jurisdiction is estab-
lished, insurance companies tend to appear and defend. Where
the defendant is an Indian and the activity occurred within
Indian country, the insurer may have no choice but to appear
in tribal court.' 9 ' The major problem with insurance, for the
attorney with a claim in an Indian court, is the availability of
exclusive jurisdiction, state agencies must repect and act on tribal court order). But
see Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 144 (N.D. 1980) (full faith and credit clause
does not apply to Indian tribes); Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (full faith and credit and comity do not require recognition of tribal
custom).
187. Smith v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, 783 F.2d
1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (comity requires deference to tribal court procedures).
Accord Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.21 (1978); see also United
States ex rel Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 103 (1856) (tribal law should be placed on
same footing as other "territorial" laws). See generally Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold, 467 U.S. 138 (1986) (denial by state of access to state
court for enforcement of Indian court judgments unduly burdensome).
188. 25 USC § 1911(d) (1976). See Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah
County, 624 F. Supp. 130, 133 (D.Ut. 1985) (Indian child welfare act requires state
courts to grant full faith and credit to orders obtained under the act).
189. Matter of Tsosie, 3 Navajo Rptr. 182, 185 (D. Chinle 1981) (Bureau of Indian
Affairs should enforce a Navajo writ of wage garnishment for child support since it
implements both the tribal and the federal statute).
190. National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribes of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 847 (1985). See generally Swift Transportation Co. v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D.
Ariz. 1982), vacated as moot, 574 F. Supp. 710 (1983).
191. See generally Williams v. Lee, 359 U.S. 217 (1959).
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insurance payments for injuries caused by the tribe, its agen-
cies, and enterprises.
These problems arise because much of the governmental
and business activity on Indian reservations is tribal. Tribal
governments own and operate everything from mines and
sewer systems to air transport services and religious shrines.
Therefore, when someone is injured by a tribal activity the
remedies are generally limited to tribal forums.1 92
When tribes contract with the United States to provide
governmental services on the reservation, they are required by
federal statutes 193 and regulations 194 to obtain liability insur-
ance to compensate those injured by their activities. Of equal
importance is the fact that these regulations require the
insurer to waive the tribal right to a defense of tribal sovereign
immunity, at least to the limits of the policy. However, if the
regulation requiring waiver is not followed, it is unclear
whether a remedy is available to an injured claimant. Thus,
the problem with insurance is usually not the failure to obtain
insurance but the failure by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or
the tribe to make sure that the insurer cannot raise the tribal
defense of immunity when a claim is filed.195 The mere
obtaining of insurance coverage by a tribe does not waive the
defense of sovereign immunity.' 9 6 Without such a waiver, the
insurance may be worthless to everyone except the insurer
who received the premium. The first thing that an attorney
representing a client with a potential claim against a tribal
entity should do is review any available insurance policy to
determine whether a waiver exists. If no express waiver
exists, the immunity defense will not be overcome simply
192. Weeks Construction, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, 797 F.2d 668, 671
(8th Cir. 1986).
193. 25 USC §§ 450f(c), 450g(c) (1976).
194. 25 C.F.R. §§ 271.45, 274.39 (1985); see also 48 CFR § P.H.S. 352.280-4(a), (f)
(1986); 48 C.F.R. § P.H.S. 352.280-4(a)(21) (1986) (cost reimbursement contract clauses);
352.280-4 (fixed price contract clauses) 25(b)(4) & (f)) (1986) §.
195. But see Smith Plumbing Co., v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., - Ariz. -, -,
13 Indian L. Rptr. 5055, 5056-57 (1986) (state court may adjudicate dispute arising from
surety bond where tribal involvement is minimal).
196. Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 169 (Alaska 1977) (purchase of insurance
does not waive tribal sovereign immunity). Accord Graves v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 117 Ariz. 32, 35, 570 P.2d 803, 805 (1977) (purchase of insurance does not strip
tribe of sovereign immunity); Tome v. Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo Rptr. 159, 160 (D.
Window Rock 1983) (insurance coverage of tribal government is a liability issue and
does not waive sovereign immunity).
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because the tribal activity is commercial in nature,1 97 or
because the activity occurred outside the reservation. 198
F. Bar Membership
Membership in the bar of the court, or association with
someone who is a tribal bar member, is required by most
Indian courts before a lawyer can practice there.199 Indian
courts admit persons who have not been admitted to any state
or federal bar, generally called "tribal court advocates," to
practice. 200 The small number of tribal courts which prohibit
lawyers from representing clients in proceedings before them
is declining and such courts generally do not assert jurisdic-
tion, other than the right to exclude, over non-Indians.
Requirements for admission to the tribal bar usually
include familiarity with the tribal constitution, code, and rules
of court. A court administrator or clerk will usually have the
necessary information and form of petition for admission to
practice. An annual fee is sometimes charged for admission
and some tribes levy tax on the practice of law within the res-
ervation. Tribal taxes imposed on the practice of law do not
deny assistance of counsel.20 ' Such fees and taxes, like state
assessments, are deductible from federal income taxes. 2
A few Indian courts now require successful completion of
a bar examination prior to the representation of clients in the
court. The examination is usually based on the tribal code and
constitution. Familiarity with tribal traditions and customary
law are required by a few Indian courts. Each new admittee to
197. Morgan v. Colorado River Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 430, 443 P.2d 421, 424 (1968)
(fact that in jury occurred at tribal resort did not affect tribal immunity). Accord Long
v. Chemhuevi Tribe, 115 Cal. App. 3d 853, 858, 171 Cal. Rptr. 733, 735 (1981), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1982) (tribal sovereign immunity subordinate only to federal
government).
198. North Sea Products v. Clipper Seafoods, 92 Wash. 2d 236, 237-38, 95 P.2d 938,
939-40 (1979) (immunity extends to garnishment proceedings).
199. Matter of the Practice of Law In the Courts of the Navajo Nation, 4 Navajo
Rptr. 75, 77 (1983) (Navajo courts will grant Navajo Bar membership to Hopi
practitioner since Hopi Courts reciprocate).
200. LaFloe v. Smith, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6007, 6007 (Fort Peck Ct. App. 1984) (trial
record must indicate reason that individual denied admission to tribal bar). Accord
Matter of the Practice of William P. Battles, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6022, 6023-24 (Navajo
Ct. App. 1982) (Navajo Tribal Code allows establishment of qualifications for
admission to bar).
201. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1147 (8th Cir. 1973)
(taxes imposed on practice of law in tribal court does not deprive criminal defendants
of counsel in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act).
202. 26 C.F.R. § 305 (1985).
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the tribal bar will be required to take an oath to uphold the
tribal code and constitution. This oath is similar in effect to
that taken prior to admission to state and federal courts and
does not prevent the admittee from attacking the jurisdiction
of the court.
It may be wise, in order to fully represent a client with a
case before an Indian court, to discuss the matter with an advo-
cate. These non-lawyer members of the tribal bar are regu-
larly before the court, are well acquainted with its procedures
and customs, and are often skilled practitioners able to try
cases to the court with great competence. The court can usu-
ally produce a list of advocates who frequently appear. Associ-
ation of a lawyer with tribal court advocate is not uncommon
and may be absolutely necessary in the few instances where
the tribal code does not allow lawyers or non-members of the
tribe to practice in the court.2 °3
VII. CONCLUSION
In the past decade, advances in the responsibilities and
competence of the Indian courts have been rapid and substan-
tial. The decision in National Farmers Union, directing liti-
gants in matters arising on the reservation to the Indian
courts, can only increase the speed at which these institutions
are changing. Major obstacles, however, will have to be over-
come before the Indian courts can assume a clear and consis-
tent role in the American scheme of government. One such
obstacle is the lack of an active, central appellate system to
which the Indian courts and litigants in them can relate.
In 1934, when Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Col-
lier and Associate Solicitor Felix Cohen first proposed the
Indian Reorganization Act, 2°4 it contained a plan for a special
federal court designed to exercise jurisdiction within Indian
country.205 This special court would have acted as an appellate
court for the Indian trial courts.0 6 Collier, through his advo-
cacy for the Pueblo Lands Act 2 ' and the Indian Reorganiza-
203. In the Matter of the Practice of William P. Battles, 10 Indian L. Rptr. at 6023-
24 (Navajo Nation at one time prohibited attorneys from practicing in its courts).
204. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-79 (1980)).
205. S. Res. 2755, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 2440 tit. IV, §§ 3, 4 (1934).
206. I& at § 5.
207. F. CoHEN, supra note 43, at 390-93.
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tion Act2 . and Cohen, through his HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW and other publications, were farsighted, powerful,
and central figures in the revitalization of the American Indian
nations in the twentieth century. The special court proposed
by Collier and Cohen was dropped from the Act, but the spirit
in which this proposal was made should cause those who are
looking to the future of tribal courts and tribal governments to
consider the value of an active appellate body designed to
review the decisions of Indian courts.
Today, despite their poverty, the legislative and executive
branches of Indian governments have become respected and
powerful, often sitting as equals at the tables of government in
the United States.2 "9 Bouyed by federal court decisions, the
Indian Reorganization Act, the Self-Determination Act, and
other statutes and policies that support tribal government, tri-
bal legislative and executive branches have advanced in
strength, expertise, and influence.
For various reasons, the Indian courts have lagged behind.
Burdened by lack of respect from their fellow judges on the
state and federal bench, lack of interest from their own tribal
councils, and lack of funds, they have struggled to attain rec-
ognition as an equal branch of tribal government.
A central focus of the Indian nations today, as many of the
cases cited in this article point out, is the stabilization of tribal
governments as legitimate political entities within the Ameri-
can federal system of government, with paramount control
over their own territories, treaty rights, and resources. Tribal
legislators and executives must understand that such a stabili-
zation of their authority is impossible without a strong, effec-
tive, independent and respected Indian court system. Without
an effective Indian judiciary, the tribes will always be depen-
dent on foreign, sometimes hostile, state or federal judges to
decide crucial questions that arise within the tribal territory.
Lack of appropriations, facilities, and jurisdictional confu-
sion are all important problems which must be faced and
resolved by the Indian judiciary if it is to successfully carry out
its responsibility to the people on the nation's reservations.
208. Id. at 129-33.
209. "Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a government to
government basis and to pursue the policy of self- government for Indian tribes . . ."
President Ronald Reagan's Policy Statement on Indian Affairs, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 98, 99 (January 24, 1983).
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However, a central problem faced by the Indian courts in their
quest for full legitimacy within the American judiciary, is the
lack, in most instances, of a broad based, efficient, and active
appellate system.
The establishment of permanent appellate courts could
bring a host of benefits to the Indian judiciary including: regu-
lar publication of decisions, a framework for administering the
activities of trial courts, fiscal efficiency, a place for the active
and principled debate of major issues affecting tribal people,
and full recognition by other governments of the tribal judici-
ary as an impartial and independent body. Any unjustified
reputation for impermanence and unfairness which may now
burden the Indian judiciary is due, in part, to this lack of a
cohesive appellate system. An ad hoc appellate court staffed
by pro tem judges is a legally adequate and defensible system,
but it fails to provide the institutional foundation on which
Indian court processes and jurisdiction can best be constructed.
The single federal court envisioned by Collier and Cohen
is unnecessary. Models for regional inter-tribal appellate sys-
tems based on tribal sovereignty and inter-tribal compacts are
already in place in the Dakotas and Pacific Northwest. More-
over, the Navajo Supreme Court's governance over its district
trial courts is an example to be followed. The Bureau of
Indian Affairs, which advises and assists most tribal govern-
ments in funding and operating their courts could have sub-
stantial impact on the establishment of such regional appellate
courts by encouraging the efficient expenditure of federal
funds used for supporting tribal appellate systems.
